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Abstract
The practice of “standardized” testing has been embedded in United States federal
education policy since at least the passage of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act
of 1965.  The roots of standardized testing in American education, grounded in Kantian
Modern Thought, can be traced to the U.S. Military Academy at Westpoint in the early 1800s
and the rise of scientific management in the early 1900s.  First and foremost, for a test to be
“standardized” the knowledge tested must be assumed to be “true”—universally accepted as
being outside the bounds of values.
Consistent with both the views of the Founders and contemporary U.S. Supreme
Court decisions that public education is necessary for successful governance, this enquiry
recognizes that the primary purpose of American public education has been to prepare
students for the fundamental political office of citizen.  Citizens must ideally be able to make
informed political judgements utilizing the full spectrum of thought—knowledge in its
broadest sense including knowledge unbounded by values.  Fundamental to U.S.
Constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech is freedom of thought.  Given the nexus
between public education and governance, logic would necessitate a critical examination of
whether the practice of standardized testing is consistent with preparing students for
citizenship.
Critical Enquiry challenges Modern Thought and other modes of thought with the
general methodology following the spirit of Jacques Derrida’s notion of deconstruction.  The
specific analytical framework for this enquiry is Jean-François Lyotard’s notion of
“rewriting.”  Necessarily, this enquiry begins with a history of freedom of thought beginning
ii
iii
in Ancient Greece and culminating with the U.S. Supreme Court’s Bradenburg (1969)
decision.  This is followed by a history of political judgement beginning with Protagoras and
ending with John Rawls.
This enquiry reveals that the practice of using government mandated standardized
achievement tests of knowledge in American public schools is antithetical to the type of
education necessary to prepare students to exercise their right to freedom of thought in order
to make informed political judgements.  Unbounded political judgement and freedom of
thought necessitate that students utilize a wide variety of what Lyotard, following Ludwig
Wittgenstein, refers to as “language games” and requires access to multiple viewpoints. 
Standardized testing, on the other hand, allows for only what Lyotard notes as the denotative
(true/false) cognitive language game and privileges the views of certain individuals and
groups.  Standardized testing constitutes what Lyotard calls a differend, is totalitarian in
nature, and represents a politics of the intellectual.  The practice advocates a particular
“Truth” sanctioned by the government and effectively silences teachers, students, and local
school districts through terror.  The government, through standardized testing, operates as
the “majority” language game.  In order to redress the differend, future enquiry ought to
consider policy and practice that would enable American public education to be consistent
with the American democratic ideals.
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Chapter 1
Introduction and the Problem
One’s responsibility before thought consists, on the contrary, in detecting differends and in
finding the (impossible) idiom for phrasing them.  This is what a philosopher does.  An
intellectual is someone who helps forget differends, by advocating a given genre, whichever
one it may be (including the ecstasy of sacrifice), for the sake of political hegemony.1
-Jean-François Lyotard
Introduction
Although issues surrounding the use of “standardized” testing in American public
schools have dominated political discourse for some time, many, if not most, analyses fail
to raise fundamental philosophical questions regarding the practice.  Ideally, democracy
requires citizens who can make informed political judgements in the voting booth, which in
turn necessitates citizens utilizing freedom of thought.  As a result, it is critical to consider
whether the practice of standardized testing is consistent with preparing students for the task
of democratic citizenship.  In an attempt to examine this question as a philosopher, consistent
with Lyotard, this study utilized a framework that challenged traditional education research
with the hope of having been responsible before thought.
 Jean-François Lyotard, The Differend: Phrases in Dispute, trans. Georges Van Den Abbeele1
(Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), 142.
1
2The Problem
While disagreements took place over what ought to be taught, the role the national
government should have, and how schools should be funded, the notion that public education
is necessary for successful governance was broadly accepted in the early years of the United
States.   The Founders, including, but not limited to, Thomas Jefferson, Benjamin Rush, and2
George Washington, believed that the primary purpose of public education was to prepare
students for the fundamental political office of citizen.   In the logic of ideal democracy,3
reason would dictate that successful governance requires citizens who possess the ability and
resources to make informed political judgements.   David Easton, a distinguished political4
scientist, described politics as, “the authoritative allocation of values for a society.”   In order5
to make informed political judgements regarding the allocation of values, citizens must
ideally be able to consider the full spectrum of thought (knowledge in its broadest
sense)–which is the essence of the United States Constitutional guarantee of freedom of
speech.  Fundamental to freedom of speech is freedom of thought.   Given the nexus between6
public education and governance, it is necessary to examine whether public education
practice is consistent with preparing students for citizenship.
 Lawrence A. Cremin, American Education: The National Experience 1783-1876 (New York, NY:2
Harper & Row, Publishers, 1980), 124-128.
 The purpose of public education for citizenship will be discussed in Chapter 2.3
 The notion of political judgement will be discussed at length in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4.4
 David Easton, The Political System: An Inquiry Into the State of Political Science (New York, NY:5
Alfred A. Knopf, 1953), 129; David Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Pentice-Hall, Inc., 1965), 50.
 The argument that freedom of thought is fundamental to freedom of speech will be made explicitly6
in Chapter 2.  In addition, Chapter 2 will survey the history of freedom of thought.
3American public education policy is currently dominated by the practice of
standardized testing.  Initially becoming commingled with public education after passage of
the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, standardized testing has subsequently
remained a requirement in order for states to secure federal funds.  Current federal education
policy, enacted in 2009, of which standardized testing constitutes a major role, is “Race to
the Top.”  Designed to encourage certain education reforms, Race to the Top awards
competitive grants to qualifying states.  The central condition for state recipients is that they
develop common standards and then use standardized achievement tests  to assess learning.7 8
Most contemporary examinations of public education policy and practice have been
conducted through the guise of Modern Thought.  Modern Thought  is characterized by such9
technologies as the following: division, quantitative rationality, classification, normality,
hierarchical ordering, efficiency, theory, systems theory, and progress.  A perspective that
challenges Modern Thought and other modes of thought is Critical Enquiry.   This10
 Standardized achievement tests will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.7
 U.S. Department of Education, “Race to the Top Program: Executive Summary,” November 2009,8
http://www2.ed.gov/programs/racetothetop/executive-summary.pdf (27 October 2010), 2 - 3, 7 - 8.
 For an interesting perspective on how the world became modern see, Stephen Greenblatt, The9
Swerve: How the World Became Modern, (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company, 2011).
 Critical Enquiry signifies an ongoing project of Charles Fazzaro and his graduate students.  The10
Critical Enquiry project is conscious of the effect of modernity on contemporary education policy and practice
and strives to develop approaches to American public education enquiry at a fundamental philosophical level
in order to determine whether current education policy and practice is consistent with the American democratic
ideals.  Fazzaro describes Critical Enquiry as, “a particular kind of enquiry that challenges the traditional
notions of ‘research’ regarding the policies and practices of institutions. . . . The capital ‘C’ in Critical
emphasizes social criticism at the most fundamental level of what ought to constitute ideal, just, democratic
social structures.  The capital ‘E’ in Enquiry emphasizes the self-conscious use of all forms of analysis and
interpretation of discourses that create, maintain, and justify social structures within particular social, political,
economic, and legal contexts.  The notion of discourse relative to Critical Enquiry includes meanings
consciously expressed through narratives—in the broadest symbolic sense of the notion—including not only
phonic and graphic texts, signs, and symbols, but individual and group behaviors and institutional practices. 
4perspective might yield a fundamentally different analysis regarding whether the practice of
standardized testing is consistent with preparing students for citizenship.
The Statement of the Problem
The purpose of this Critical Enquiry was to examine whether the practice of
government mandated standardized achievement tests of knowledge in American public
schools is consistent with the type of education necessary for citizens to exercise their right
to freedom of thought in order to make informed political judgements.
Framework for the Enquiry
The general methodology of Critical Enquiry follows the spirit of the French
philosopher Jacques Derrida’s notion of deconstruction.   The views of Jean-François11
Lyotard (1924 - 1998 CE), the late contemporary French political philosopher, are consistent
with the underlying purpose of the Critical Enquiry project and deconstruction, relative to
the implications of freedom of thought for political judgement.  As such, Lyotard was of
particular importance to this study since much of his work challenges the notions of Modern
Thought.
The choice of spelling recognizes that enquiry is best used to mean ‘to ask’ within the general contexts of
policies and practices; whereas, inquiry has a narrower focus in that it is best used when referring to a ‘formal
investigation,’ such as that of a crime.”  Charles J. Fazzaro, “Critical Enquiry: Implications for Education Policy
and Practice,” The Journal of Philosophy and History of Education 52 (2002): 52 - 56.
 Derrida notes, “The very meaning and mission of deconstruction is to show that things–texts,11
institutions, traditions, societies, beliefs, and practices of whatever size and sort you need–do not have definable
meanings and determinable missions, that they are always more than any mission would impose, that they
exceed the boundaries they currently occupy.  What is really going on in things, what is really happening, is
always to come.  Every time you try to stabilize the meaning of a thing, to fix it in its missionary position, the
thing itself, if there is anything at all to it, slips away.  A ‘meaning’ or a ‘mission’ is a way to contain and
compact things, like a nutshell, gathering them into a unity, whereas deconstruction bends all its efforts to
stretch these boundaries, to transgress these confines, to interrupt and disjoin all such gathering.”  Jacques
Derrida, Deconstruction in a Nutshell: A Conversation with Jacques Derrida, ed. John D. Caputo (New York,
NY: Fordham University Press, 1997), 31-32.
5Lyotard was born in Versailles and is generally associated with the movement called
post-structuralism. In a general sense, post-structuralism challenges the scientific
assumptions of structuralism and the notion that the signified can ever have a stable
meaning.   Lyotard studied philosophy and literature at the Sorbonne in Paris under Maurice12
Merleau-Ponty.   His early writings, during the 1940s and early 1950s, reflected his strong13
interest in politics.  His first book, Phenomenology,  surveyed the history of phenomenology14
linking it with Marxism.  Teaching in Algeria during the colonial war profoundly affected
Lyotard and when he returned to France he became involved with the Marxist group
Socialisme ou Barbarie.   After abandoning Marxism, Lyotard witnessed the May 196815
student movement while he lectured at Nanterre University.  In 1971, Lyotard earned his
doctorate.  His dissertation was titled Discourse, Figure,  and he became a professor of16
philosophy at Vincennes University.   17
 For a more thorough distinction see, Steven Best and Douglas Kellner, Postmodern Theory: Critical12
Interrogations (New York, NY: The Guilford Press, 1991), 20-25. 
 Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908 - 1961 CE) was a French phenomenologist who taught at the13
Sorbonne.  He was influenced by Edmund Husserl (1859 - 1938 CE), the German philosopher and founder of
phenomenology.  The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 2nd ed., s.v. “Merleau-Ponty, Maurice” and
“Husserl, Edmund.” 
 Jean-François Lyotard, Phenomenology, trans. Brian Beakley, (Albany, NY: State University of New14
York Press, 1991). 
 Socialisme ou Barbarie was founded by Cornelius Castoriadis (1922 - 1997 CE) and Claude Lefort15
(1924 - 2010 CE).  A major emphasis of the group was to develop “a theory of state capitalism” based on a
Marxist methodology.  Best and Kellner, 148, 179; The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 2nd ed., s.v.
“Lyotard, Jean-François.” 
 Jean-François Lyotard, Discourse, Figure, trans. Antony Hudek and Mary Lydon (Minneapolis, MN:16
University of Minnesota Press, 2011).
 Best and Kellner, 147-148, 179; The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 2nd ed., s.v. “Lyotard,17
Jean-François.”
6In Discourse, Figure, Lyotard challenged many of the assumptions behind
structuralism which he would continue to do for the remainder of his life.  Libidinal
Economy  was Lyotard’s other major early work and signified Lyotard’s final split with18
Marxism.  His next three major publications include Just Gaming,  The Postmodern19
Condition,  and The Differend.  In these three works, Lyotard developed a philosophy of20
language that is concerned with making judgements.  Lyotard’s later work continued to focus
on politics, aesthetics, and postmodern ideas.  Lyotard’s last major work was Lessons on the
Analytic of the Sublime.   In this publication, Lyotard provided a critical reading of part of21
Kant’s third critique, the Critique of Judgement.   The analytical framework for this study22
was based around Lyotard’s notion of “rewriting.”
Lyotard used the term “rewriting modernity” to describe his work instead of
popularized terms such as “postmodernity,” “postmodernism,” or “postmodern.”   For23
Lyotard, rewriting rejects the notion that the postmodern can in any way be separate from the
modern.  Lyotard explains that, “Modernity is constitutionally and ceaselessly pregnant with
 Jean-François Lyotard, Libidinal Economy, trans. Iain Hamilton Grant (Bloomington, IN: Indiana18
University Press, 1993).
 Jean-François Lyotard and Jean-Loup Thébaud, Just Gaming, trans. Wlad Godzich (Minneapolis,19
MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1985).
 Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. Geogg20
Bennington and Brian Massumi (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1984).
 Jean-François Lyotard, Lessons on the Analytic of the Sublime, trans. Elizabeth Rottenberg21
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994).
 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, trans. J.H. Bernard (New York, NY: Barnes & Noble, 2005).22
 Jean-François Lyotard, The Inhuman: Reflections on Time, trans. Geoffrey Bennington and Rachel23
Bowlby (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991), 24.
7its postmodernity.”   Rewriting is similar to the Freudian concept of “working through.”24
Lyotard described working through as, “work without end,” and the rules for this type of
analysis are, “do not prejudge, suspend judgment, give the same attention to everything that
happens as it happens.”   As such, this Critical Enquiry, through the use of a Lyotardian25
analytical framework, was a deconstruction of the practice of standardized testing embedded
in federal education policy as it relates to the type of education necessary for citizenship.
The Importance of the Study
Given the pivotal role educators play in preparing students for citizenship, educators
ought to continually examine whether current public education policy and practice is
consistent with the task of preparing students to be citizens.  Justice Frankfurter noted the
importance of this in the landmark 1952 United States Supreme Court case Wieman v.
Updegraff arguing:
It is the special task of teachers to foster those habits of open-mindedness and
critical inquiry which alone make for responsible citizens, who, in turn, make
possible an enlightened and effective public opinion.  Teachers must fulfill
their function by precept and practice, by the very atmosphere which they
generate; they must be exemplars of open-mindedness and free inquiry.26
In addition, historically, there are notable cases wherein public education policy and practice
have not been consistent with the democratic ideals.  For example, citizens of color have only
recently begun to exercise their rights inherent in the American democratic ideal.  Even after
 Lyotard, The Inhuman, 25.24
 Lyotard, The Inhuman, 30.25
 Wieman et al. v. Updegraff et al., 344 U.S. 183 (1952).26
8the abolishment of slavery in 1865,  African Americans were unable to attend equal public27
schools until at least Brown v. Board of Education.   Full legal access and equity in the28
voting booth was not realized by African Americans until the elimination of the poll tax in
1964.   Similar examples could be provided for other minorities in both public education29
and the broader society at large. 
Many, if not most, studies in education are grounded in the notions of Modern
Thought.  Critical Enquiry, on the other hand, provides a unique perspective for the critique
because Critical Enquiry can utilize a much broader philosophical lens.  Through Critical
Enquiry, this study found that inconsistencies exist between the practice of standardized
testing and the type of education necessary for citizens to exercise their right to freedom of
thought in order to make informed political judgements.  As a result, the analysis contained
in this Critical Enquiry could be used to influence public discourse. 
The Limitations of the Study
As a Critical Enquiry, this study strived to determine if questions ought to be raised
concerning the consistency between the American democratic ideals and education policy
and practice.  As such, this study does not necessarily provide any universal prescriptions
designed to guide the future of public education or establish any particular conception of
“Truth,” but instead included a broad analysis that sought to look at the problem in an
entirely new way.  This Critical Enquiry was meant to be descriptive only.
 U.S. Constitution. amend. XIII.27
 Brown et al. v. Board of Education of Topeka et al. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).28
 U.S. Constitution. amend. XXIV.29
9Summary
This Critical Enquiry concerned the requirement that public schools use
“standardized” achievement tests of knowledge in order to qualify for federal funds as
mandated in the U.S. Department of Education’s Race to the Top policy.  The framework
used for the enquiry was Lyotard’s notion of rewriting.  In order to conduct this enquiry and
provide context for the reader, it was necessary for several chapters to provide the
foundation.  Chapter 2 is a history of freedom of thought.  Chapters 3 and 4 are a survey of
the notion of political judgement from Protagoras to Rawls.  Chapters 5 and 6 are a
Lyotardian examination.  Chapter 5 is an analysis of the implications of the practice of
standardized testing on freedom of thought, while Chapter 6 is an analysis of the implications
of standardized testing on political judgement.  Lastly, Chapter 7 is a summary of the study,
conclusions, and recommendations.   
Chapter 2
History of Freedom of Thought
The First Amendment is meant to assure Americans that they can believe what they will and
say what they believe.1
-Anthony Lewis
Introduction
In order to examine whether the practice of government mandated standardized
achievement testing is consistent with the type of education necessary for citizens to exercise
their right to freedom of thought in order to make informed political judgements, it is
necessary to provide a contextual framework.  This chapter is a survey of the history of
freedom of thought.  This survey depends on a discussion of the purpose of American public
education, the connection between freedom of thought and freedom of speech, and the
various rationales for freedom of speech.
Purpose of American Public Education
The primary purpose of American public education has been to prepare students for
the fundamental political office of citizen.  The views of the Founders, including, but not
limited to, Thomas Jefferson, Benjamin Rush, and George Washington support this notion. 
 Anthony Lewis, Freedom for the Thought That We Hate: A Biography of the First Amendment, (New1
York, NY: Basic Books, 2007), 106.
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Jefferson believed that public education was necessary for good governance and that the
purpose of education was to produce citizens.  In a letter written to Benjamin Franklin in
1777, Jefferson said, “Educate and inform the whole mass of the people.  Enable them to see
that it is their interest to preserve peace and order, and they will preserve them.  And it
requires no very high degree of education to convince them of this.  They are the only sure
reliance for the preservation of our liberty.”   He further illustrated this position in a letter2
to his former professor in support of a bill for general education:
I think by far the most important bill in our whole code is that for the
diffusion of knowledge among the people.  No other sure foundation can be
devised for the preservation of freedom and happiness. . . .  The tax which
will be paid for this purpose is not more than the thousandth part of what will
be paid to kings, priests, and nobles who will rise up among us if we leave the
people in ignorance.3
The necessary link between public education and the success of the government is evident
in Jefferson’s thought.
Consistent with Jefferson’s notion of education, Rush, in his presentation to the
legislature of Pennsylvania in 1786, not only supported the idea that public schools should
be established, but also echoed the view that schools are essential for good governance.  He
urged the citizens of Pennsylvania to support the establishment of free public schools in
every township to be paid for by taxes.  Rush believed that education provided benefits for
all members of society, thus all should pay.  He  argued that learning is both helpful for
 Thomas Jefferson, Jefferson Himself: The Personal Narrative of a Many-sided American, ed.2
Bernard Mayo (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1942), 145.
 Jefferson, Jefferson Himself, 89.3
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citizens to understand their rights and “it promotes just ideas of laws and government.”  4
Rush also illustrated the purpose of public education for citizenship in his essay, “Of the
Mode of Education Proper in a Republic.”  He explained, “Our schools of learning, by
producing one general, and uniform system of education, will render the mass of the people
more homogenous, and thereby fit them more easily for uniform and peaceable
government.”  5
Washington also could foresee the importance of education to good governance. 
Washington mentioned this in 1790 during his first message to Congress when he explained,
“There is nothing which can better deserve your patronage than the promotion of science and
literature.  Knowledge is in every country the surest basis of happiness.  In one in which the
measure of government receives their impressions so immediately from the sense of the
community as in ours, it is proportionally essential.”   Washington further illustrated this6
point when giving his farewell address in 1796,  “Promote, then, as an object of primary
importance, institutions, for the general diffusion of knowledge.  In proportion as the
structure of a government gives force of public opinion, it is essential that public opinion be
enlightened.”   Jefferson, Rush, and Washington recognized the importance of preparing7
students for citizenship.
 Benjamin Rush, Essays: Literary, Moral and Philosophical, ed. Michael Meranze (Schenectady, NY:4
Union College Press, 1988), 1-4.
 Rush, Essays, 5.5
 Ellwood P. Cubberley, Public Education in the United States: A Study and Interpretation of6
American Educational History, rev. ed (Cambridge, MA: The Riverside Press, 1934), 89.
 Ellwood P. Cubberley, A Brief History of Education: A History of the Practice and Progress and7
Organization of Education (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1922), 287.
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Contemporarily, Newton Edwards, an education legal historian, summarized the
connection between government and education.  He concluded:
No one familiar with the record can doubt that the dynamics of public
education in this country is to be found in the emergence of the democratic
state as a form of political organization.  The essentially civic character of
American education is amply documented in the writings of statesmen and
publicists, in the debates of constitutional conventions, in the official
pronouncements of organized labor, in editorial opinion, and in numerous
court decisions.8
Edwards best summarized the legal theory regarding the importance of public education to
government noting, “Public education is not merely a function of government; it is of
government.”   9
This perspective has been recognized by the United States Supreme Court in 2003
in Grutter v. Bollinger.  Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, delivering the opinion for the court
upholding the law school admissions standards of the University of Michigan, quoted from
the 1954 landmark United States Supreme Court decision Brown v. Board of Education,10
explaining that, “This court has long recognized that ‘education . . . is the very foundation
of good citizenship.’”   Citizens are required to make informed political judgements which11
requires freedom of thought.
 Newton Edwards, “The Evolution of American Educational Ideals,” in Education in a Democracy,8
ed. Newton Edwards (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1941), 13.
 Newton Edwards, The Courts and Public Schools: The Legal Basis of School Organization and9
Administration, 3rd ed. (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1971), 23.
 Brown v. Board.10
 Grutter v. Bollinger et al., 539 U.S. 306 (2003).11
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Rationale for Freedom of Thought
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution establishes that, “Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”   As12
argued below, fundamental to the citizens’ right to freedom of speech is freedom of thought.
Freedom of Thought Necessary for Freedom of Speech
The importance of freedom of thought for freedom of speech was exemplified by
Samuel Adams shortly after the Declaration of Independence was adopted.  Adams
explained, “Driven from every corner of the earth, freedom of thought and the right of private
judgement in matters of conscience direct their course to this happy country for their last
asylum.”   J. B. Bury, an eminent British historian, agreed and noted that, “freedom of13
thought, in any valuable sense, includes freedom of speech.”   Thomas I. Emerson, a noted14
legal theorist, concurs explaining, “Freedom of thought and communication are central to any
system of individual rights.”15
Contemporarily, this position has been supported in 1943 by Justice Murphy of the
United States Supreme Court.  Justice Murphy’s concurring opinion in the United States
 U.S. Constitution. amend. I.12
 Samuel Adams, “Speech in Philadelphia,” 1 August 1776, quoted in Anthony Lewis, Freedom for13
the Thought That We Hate: A Biography of the First Amendment, (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2007), 183.
 J. B. Bury, History of Freedom of Thought (New York, NY: Henry Holt and Company, 1913), 8.14
 Thomas I. Emerson, “Freedom of Speech,” in The First Amendment: Selections from the15
Encyclopedia of the American Constitution, ed. Leonard W. Levy, Kenneth L. Karst, and Dennis J. Mahoney
(New York, NY: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1990), 21.
15
Supreme Court decision West Virginia v. Barnette illustrates the importance of freedom of
thought for freedom of speech.  Justice Murphy explained, “The right of freedom of thought
and of religion as guaranteed by the Constitution against State action includes both the right
to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all, except insofar as essential
operations of government may require it for the preservation of an orderly society.”   Robert16
Hargreaves, a noted contemporary journalist, best explains the importance of freedom of
thought and of freedom of speech arguing that, “It entails the freedom to be provocative - to
say things that cause offence, to insult the opinions of others, to impart information others
may wish to suppress, to voice views others may hate.  It also entails the duty to be tolerant
of those who voice such views, however much one personally disagrees with them.”   An17
explicit connection exists between freedom of thought and freedom of speech.  In a sense,
the two could almost be used interchangeably.  There are four major rationales for freedom
of speech.  These include the argument from the perspective of truth, the argument from the
perspective of democracy, the argument for the good life, and the argument for individuality.
Argument from the Perspective of Truth
One rationale for freedom of speech is the argument from the perspective of truth. 
This position argues that in order to effectively search for truth, one must be able to engage
in open dialogue without fear of being reprimanded for any position contrary to the majority
opinion.  Underlying this position is the argument that the truth will become evident when
 West Virginia State Board of Education et al. v. Barnette et al., 319 U.S. 624 (1943).16
 Robert Hargreaves, The First Freedom: A History of Free Speech, (Stroud, England: Sutton17
Publishing Limited, 2002), 311.
16
all opinions have had the opportunity to be discussed.  Frederick Schauer, Professor of Law
at the University of Virginia School of Law, summarizes this view noting:
They all share a belief that freedom of speech is not an ends but a means, a
means of identifying and accepting truth.  Further, they have a common faith
in the power of truth to prevail in the adversary process, to emerge victorious
from the competition among ideas.  Finally, they share a deep scepticism with
respect to accepted beliefs and widely acknowledged truth, logically coupled
with a keen recognition of the possibility that the opinion we reject as false
may in fact be true.  A heavy dose of fallibilism is implicit in the view that
freedom of speech is a necessary condition to the rational search for truth.18
Indicative in this position is also the fear that the government, if given the ability to
determine truth, will error.  This position has also been compared to a cross-examination in
the judicial system in which public opinion is the jury.  Similar to the argument from the
perspective of truth is the argument from the perspective of democracy.19
Argument from the Perspective of Democracy
Another rationale for freedom of speech is the argument from the perspective of
democracy.  This position argues that since the people are sovereign in a democracy, it is
necessary for the people to possess freedom of speech to exercise their political rights. 
Possessing this freedom is vital for a variety of political reasons.  First, citizens need access
to information in order to make informed political judgements.  Second, citizens need to be
able to openly discuss and debate these issues in order for a healthy democracy to function. 
Finally, it is necessary for citizens in a democracy to have the freedom to disagree with the
government and openly criticize the government and government officials since they are
 Frederick Schauer, Free Speech: a philosophical enquiry, (Cambridge, England: Cambridge18
University Press, 1982), 15 - 16.
 Hargreaves, The First Freedom, 304.19
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accountable to the people.  Another rationale for freedom of speech is that it is necessary for
the good life.20
Argument for the Good Life
The argument for freedom of speech being necessary for the good life is based on the
notion that freedom of speech is not just a societal right, but an individual right.  Schauer
explains:
The argument is based on the proposition that a person who uses his faculties
to their fullest extent, who is all that it is possible to be, is in some sense
better off, and in an Aristotelian sense happier, than those whose
development is stultified.  And because it is thinking, reasoning, rationality,
and complex interrelationships with others that distinguish humanity from
other forms of animal life, then it is the faculties of reason and thinking that
are at the core of self-development.  What is seen as the ultimate goal for man
is the fullest use of the capacity to think, the greatest degree of mental
exertion, the exploration of the limits of the mind.21
The argument for the good life is based on the idea that communication of ideas provides
personal fulfillment and growth for the individual and should thus be protected.  On the other
hand, this position argues that the curtailment of freedom of thought interferes with
individual development.  Essentially, this position is an argument based on the notion of
liberty.  Similar to the argument for the good life is the argument for individuality.22
Argument for Individuality
The argument justifying freedom of speech based on individuality is really an
argument advocating liberalism.  Schauer explains the argument noting:
 Schauer, Free Speech, 35 - 36; Hargreaves, The First Freedom, 304 - 305; Emerson, “Freedom of20
Speech,” 21.
 Schauer, Free Speech, 47, 54; Emerson, “Freedom of Speech,” 20.21
 Emerson, “Freedom of Speech,” 20.22
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When the state suppresses a person’s ideas, or when the state suppresses that
person’s expression of those ideas, the state is insulting that person and
affronting his dignity. . . . When we suppress a person’s ideas, we are in
effect saying that although he may think his ideas to be as good as (or better
than) the next person’s, society feels otherwise. . . . He is not deserving of
treatment as an equal member of society.  23
The argument above is made regarding equality, but it could also be made with respect to
diversity or autonomy.  All four arguments for freedom of speech share a common theme
acknowledging some type of separation between the government and individuals.   Schauer,24
succinctly describes this general rationale for freedom of speech noting that it:
is based in large part on a distrust of the ability of government to make the
necessary distinctions, a distrust of governmental determinations of truth and
falsity, an appreciation of the fallibility of political leaders, and a somewhat
deeper distrust of governmental power in a more general sense.25
The rest of this chapter is a survey of the history of freedom of thought.
Pre-United States Constitution
As a result of Greece’s attempt at democracy, this history of freedom of thought in
the West begins in Greece.  Freedom of thought’s evolution continues in Rome, the Middle
Ages, the Renaissance and the Reformation, the struggle for freedom of religion, and the
Enlightenment.  The following sections are an exploration of the history of freedom of
thought prior to the codification of freedom of speech in the Bill of Rights to the United
States Constitution.
 Schauer, Free Speech, 62.23
 While ultimately the people are sovereign in a democracy, it is critical that the minority be protected24
from the tyranny of the majority.  It is in this sense that the term government is used.
 Schauer, Free Speech, 86.25
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Greece and Rome
The freedom to critique  was a common theme throughout Greek society, especially
in philosophy, literature, and science.  Examples include the work of Xenophanes (570 - 475
BCE),  Heraclitus (fl. 500 BCE),  and Democritus (460 - 370 BCE).   All three, among26 27 28
others, challenged the everyday conceptions of common people.  The Sophists  offer another29
example of thought that in many cases was contrary to public opinion.  In addition,
democracy had taken root in Greece which provided citizens with the opportunity to express
their opinion in an open forum.  The most important example for freedom of thought rests
with Socrates (469 - 399 BCE).30
Socrates advocated open discussion in an attempt to arrive at truth.   He rejected the31
notion that truth was constituted by the majority believing instead that reason ought to be
used in order to determine truth.  Late in life, Socrates was accused of impiety.  Refusing to
change his opinion, Socrates argued that individual truth ought to take precedent over the law
and that open discussion and debate is necessary in society.  While the state did execute
 Xenophanes was a Greek rationalist who challenged Homer’s teachings of the Greek gods.  The26
Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 2nd ed., s.v. “Xenophanes.” 
 Heraclitus was a Greek philsopher who argued that most humans were unaware of the logos, his27
principle of order in the world, and as a result have no understanding of reality.  The Cambridge Dictionary of
Philosophy, 2nd ed., s.v. “Heraclitus.” 
 Democritus was a Greek philosopher who developed the notion of atomic theory.  The Cambridge28
Dictionary of Philosophy, 2nd ed., s.v. “Democritus.” 
 The Sophists refer to a number of ancient Greeks who offered instruction for money.  As a whole29
they did not subscribe to any particular ideology.  The term is regularly used in the pejorative sense.  The
Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 2nd ed., s.v. “Sophists.”
 Bury, History of Freedom of Thought, 22 - 30.30
 Since the story of Socrates is told through Plato, this truth must be consistent with Plato’s ideal31
forms.
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Socrates for exercising freedom of thought, the notion of freedom of thought would continue
to evolve in Greece and then into Rome.32
The evolution of freedom of thought in Hellenistic society is evident in the rationalist
works of the Epicureans,  Stoics,  and Sceptics.   By the time of the late Roman Republic,33 34 35
almost no attempt was made to restrict either religion or individual opinion, except in the
case of Christianity.  While freedom of thought was widely accepted, no formal policy has
yet been found that provided legal protection for it.  After the issue of the edicts of toleration
(311 and 313 CE), this lack of formal protection for freedom of thought would lead to the
repression of freedom of thought during the Middle Ages.36
The Middle Ages
Shortly after the enactment of the above edicts, Christianity was established as the
official religion of Rome by Constantine the Great.  Freedom of thought, as a result, took a
hiatus during the Middle Ages.  Although Christianity had previously called for freedom of
thought when it was a minority, once it became the official religion it established itself as the
 Bury, History of Freedom of Thought, 30 - 35.32
 The Epicureans were one of the leading philosophical schools in Hellenistic philosophy.  They33
challenged traditional interpretation of the creation of the world by rejecting the notion of any sort of divine
entity responsible for the creation of the world.  The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 2nd ed., s.v.
“Epicureanism.” 
 The Stoics were one of the leading philosophical schools in Hellenistic philosophy.  Justice,34
according to the Stoics, can only be found in an idealized sage who acts only according to correct reason. The
Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 2nd ed., s.v. “Stoicism.”  
 The Sceptics challenged the notions of both the Epicureans and Stoics with respect to the35
justification of knowledge. The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 2nd ed., s.v. “skepticism.”  
 Bury, History of Freedom of Thought, 36 - 41, 46 - 51.36
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only form of truth, arguing that the only way to get to heaven is through the Church.   By37
the thirteenth century, the Pope controlled the kings of Europe and made the practice of
stamping out opposition to the Church a condition of continued sovereignty for the kings. 
It was the height of the Inquisition and the Church was the ultimate authority on truth
throughout the Middle Ages.38
The Renaissance and the Reformation
The Renaissance is what began the process of restoring freedom of thought from the
hands of the Church.  The literature and philosophy of Ancient Greece and Rome resurfaced. 
Intellectuals were able to compartmentalize religion from the classics.  The Reformation
replaced the Church with the Bible with respect to sovereignty.  Despite Luther and Calvin
being opponents of freedom of thought, inadvertently the Reformation provided the
conditions necessary for freedom of thought to begin to resurface since Christianity divided
into multiple entities and the Bible opened up to multiple interpretations.   A culture of
intellectual pursuit developed throughout Europe at the same time as the power of the Papacy
declined.39
Despite this new atmosphere, the Church still clung to power.  Attempts to pursue
truth through science were met with imprisonment in the case of Roger Bacon (1214 - 1293
 The forthcoming nine hundred (900) years were not of great significance to the history of freedom37
of thought.  As a result, this survey continues in the thirteenth century.
 Bury, History of Freedom of Thought, 51 - 53, 57 - 59.38
 Bury, History of Freedom of Thought, 71 - 73, 75 - 82.39
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CE).   After Copernicus established modern astronomy in 1543 when he argued for a40
heliocentric cosmology, Galileo faced the Inquisition after providing evidence for the theory
by way of the telescope.  Censorship was also utilized, via the Roman Index, after the
invention of the printing press in an attempt to keep new ideas from spreading in an effort
to curtail freedom of thought.  Interestingly, the evolution of freedom of thought would be
helped by the development of freedom of religion.41
Freedom of Religion
At the beginning of the fifteenth century, the notion of religious liberty was virtually
unknown in Western states.  By the nineteenth century, it was almost universally accepted. 
The implementation of religious liberty took two different forms.  The first form, the
jurisdictional approach, is what primarily took root in Europe in which the state was aligned
with the major Church, but allowed other minority sects to function without persecution. 
The second form, through separation, is what eventually took place in America.42
Initially, in America, little toleration occurred, such as in the case of the Puritans. 
The Puritans (1620 CE) were interested in establishing a theocratic government, not a
government based on separation of church and state.  On the other hand, Roger Williams,
who founded Providence, Rhode Island (1636 CE), established a system of government in
which the government could not intervene with religion.  While all Christians from any sect
 Roger Bacon was an English philosopher who believed that reason could be used in the service of40
theology.  He was also controversial with respect to his efforts for curricular reform.  The Cambridge
Dictionary of Philosophy, 2nd ed., s.v. “Bacon, Roger.” 
 Bury, History of Freedom of Thought, 65, 87 - 91.41
 Bury, History of Freedom of Thought, 95.42
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enjoyed full political rights, those that did not profess to Christianity were not allowed to
take part in the political process.  Eventually, after many setbacks, the attitude of freedom
of religion culminated with the ratification of the Bill of Rights to the United States
Constitution in 1791.  Many of the social and political conditions that allowed this to occur
were due to the Enlightenment.43
The Enlightenment
The Enlightenment consisted of a dramatic upheaval in the realm of social and
political thought.  The notion of rational thought was privileged during this period.  Many
of the ideas constructed during the Enlightenment affected the trajectory of freedom of
thought.  Of critical importance is the work of John Milton, John Locke, Thomas Paine, and
John Stuart Mill.
John Milton (1608 - 1674 CE),  the early Enlightenment poet most famous for44
Paradise Lost,  was a leading supporter of freedom of thought.  In response to a government45
order requiring official approval before any publication, Milton penned the Areopagitica,
arguing for the importance of freedom of the press.   Milton believes that allowing people46
to read a variety of sources, both good and bad, will help better develop virtue.  Milton also
argues that without freedom of press, ideas from other cultures, and even new ideas, that
 Bury, History of Freedom of Thought, 96 - 98, 125.43
 John Milton’s political philosophy  will be discussed further in Chapter 3.44
 John Milton, Paradise Lost, in The Major Works, ed. Stephen Orgel and Jonathan Goldberg,45
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
 John Milton, Areopagitica, in The Major Works, ed. Stephen Orgel and Jonathan Goldberg, (Oxford:46
Oxford University Press, 2003).
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might initially conflict with the current notion of truth would be stamped out without due
consideration.  He is especially concerned for such professions as teachers and doctors who
would have to constantly worry that an authority might alter the work.  Milton best explains
his position noting, “Truth and understanding are not such wares as to be monopolized and
traded in by tickets, and statutes, and standards.  We must not think to make a staple
commodity of all the knowledge in the land, to mark and license it like our broadcloth and
our woolpacks.”   Milton also makes the argument, without explicitly stating it, that freedom47
of press is necessary for freedom of speech since it is vital that citizens have the right to
express their position.  This is turn requires freedom of thought of which Milton
unequivocally supported arguing, “Give me the liberty to know, to utter, and to argue freely
according to conscience, above all liberties.”48
John Locke (1632 - 1704 CE),  the English empiricist, argued for the importance of49
freedom of thought in his Letter Concerning Toleration.   Locke believed in a distinct50
separation between religion and government.  While his argument dealt primarily with
religion, the implication is that the government lacks the authority to compel citizens to
believe in a particular notion of “Truth.”  Locke expounds:
the business of laws is not to provide for the truth of opinions, but for the
safety and security of the commonwealth, and of every particular man’s
goods and person.  And so it ought to be ; for truth certainly would do well
 Milton, Areopagitica, 248, 256 - 257, 263, 270 - 271.47
 Milton, Areopagitica, 262 - 263, 268.48
 John Locke’s political philosophy will be discussed further in Chapter 3.49
 John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, ed. Ian Shapiro (New Haven, CT: Yale University50
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enough, if she were once left to shift for herself.  She seldom has received,
and I fear never will receive, much assistance from the power of great men,
to whom she is but rarely known, and more rarely welcome.  She is not taught
by laws, nor has she any need of force to procure her entrance into the minds
of men.  Errors indeed prevail by the assistance of foreign and borrowed
succours.  But if truth makes not her way into the understanding by her own
light, she will be but the weaker for any borrowed force violence can add to
her.51
 
Locke supports the notion of freedom of thought by recognizing that “Truth” is not within
the realm of the governmental jurisdiction.  
Thomas Paine (1737 - 1809 CE), author of Common Sense,  was instrumental in52
turning American public opinion towards separation from Great Britain.  He was also an
ardent supporter of freedom of thought.  Paine illustrated his desire for freedom:
O ye that love mankind!  Ye that dare oppose, not only the tyranny, but the
tyrant, stand forth!  Every spot of the old world is overrun with oppression. 
Freedom hath been hunted round the globe.  Asia, and Africa, have long
expelled her.  – Europe regards her like a stranger, and England hath given
her warning to depart.  O!  Receive the fugitive, and prepare in time for an
asylum for mankind.53
The Declaration of Independence, in part as a result of Paine’s efforts, was issued leading to
the Revolutionary War.  In Paine’s other famous work The Rights of Man,  Paine continues54
his argument for freedom of thought while rallying against the English government.  Paine
explains, “Toleration is not the opposite of Intolerance, but is the counterfeit of it.  Both are
 Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, 219, 241.51
 Thomas Paine, Common Sense, (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 1997).52
 Paine, Common Sense, 33.53
 Thomas Paine, The Rights of Man, Kindle edition.54
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despotisms.  The one assumes to itself the right of withholding Liberty of Conscience, and
the other of granting it.”   Freedom of thought, for Paine, ought to rest with the people.55
Another important Enlightenment figure during the evolution of freedom of thought
was John Stuart Mill (1806 - 1873 CE).   Mill was a British philosopher who composed the56
famous defense of liberty, On Liberty.   In it, Mill argues that for liberty to exist in society,57
the people need to be protected both from the government and from popular opinion.  He is
an ardent supporter of the right for the minority to disagree with the majority.  Mill notes, “If
all mankind minus one, were of one opinion, and only one person were of the contrary
opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person, than he, if he had
the power, would be justified in silencing mankind.”   Echoing a libertarian philosophy, Mill58
believes that the only just reason a government can use force is to prevent harm.  Explaining
the role of an individual to society, Mill explains, “The only part of the conduct of any one,
for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others.  In the part which merely
concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute.  Over himself, over his own body
and mind, the individual is sovereign.”   Freedom of thought is absolute in every spectrum59
of thought for Mill and his work among others,  would influence the development of freedom
of thought in the United States.
 Paine, The Rights of Man, location 852.55
 John Stuart Mill’s political philosophy will be further discussed in Chapter 4.56
 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, (London, England: The Walter Scott Publishing Company) Kindle57
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 Mill, On Liberty, location 331, 345.59
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United States
Although a reading of the First Amendment could be construed as absolute, the
protections it affords from the government have never been treated that way.  In reality, the
United States, primarily through the United States Supreme Court, has attempted to balance
the freedoms protected by the First Amendment  with other interests.  The following60
sections are an exploration of the history of freedom of thought in the United States
beginning with the Bill of Rights.
Bill of Rights
The Bill of Rights came about after opposition emerged from some states over the
ratification of the United States Constitution.  Those in opposition, the Anti-Federalists, were
concerned that the federal government would have too much power over both the states and
the people.  Ratification of the Constitution occurred as a result of pressing by John Hancock
to have Congress enact a bill of rights during the first session.  James Madison, initially
opposed to a bill of rights, was instrumental in securing passage by arguing for the
importance of freedom of speech for the American principle of popular sovereignty.  The
Federalist Papers popularized many of the above Enlightenment arguments for freedom of
thought.  As a result of the efforts of both Hamilton and Madison, the Bill of Rights to the
United States Constitution was ratified in December of 1791 in which freedom of speech was
embedded in the First Amendment.61
 Although this enquiry deals primarily with the freedom of thought and freedom of speech, the60
freedom of speech clause of the First Amendment has implications for all other parts of the First Amendment. 
 Lewis, Freedom for the Thought That We Hate, 7 - 9; Akhil Reed Amar, America’s Constitution,61
(New York, NY: Random House Trade Paperbacks, 2005), 103.  For more information see, Richard Labunski,
James Madison and the Struggle for the Bill of Rights, (Oxford, England: Oxford University Pres, 2006). 
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Sedition Act
The first battle over freedom of speech protection began in 1798 with the passage of
the Sedition Act signed by President John Adams.  The act criminalized the composition or
publication of anything critical of the government.  The law was political in nature since it
was set to expire a day prior to the next president’s inauguration and was primarily used
against supporters of Thomas Jefferson.  The Sedition Act dominated the politics of the
Election of 1800.  Popular opinion was against the Sedition Act helping Jefferson to defeat
Adams in the Election of 1800.  Opponents of the Sedition Act utilized the language of the
First Amendment in their defense.  President Jefferson, consistent with public opinion,
pardoned every citizen that was convicted under the law.  While the Sedition Act was never
challenged in court, it did raise the issue of freedom of speech and freedom of the press.  The
issue of freedom of speech would not be raised again at the federal level until 1919 when the
United States Supreme Court upheld multiple convictions under the Espionage Act.62
Espionage Act and Clear and Present Danger
No federal law that restricted a freedom contained in the Bill of Rights was passed
again until 1917 when the Espionage Act was passed.  The Espionage Act was signed at the
height of World War I criminalizing any attempt to restrict the recruitment process of the
military or dissuade someone from participating in the armed services.  In March of 1919,
three cases were decided by the United States Supreme Court, all resulting in unanimous
 Lewis, Freedom for the Thought That We Hate, 11 - 16, 20 - 21.62
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opinions upholding convictions made under the Espionage Act.  The cases included Schenck
v. United States, Debs v. United States, and Frohwerk v. United States.  63
Schenck involved the arrest, under the Espionage Act, of men who had distributed
leaflets encouraging people to resist the military draft.  In their appeal to the United States
Supreme Court, the defendants argued that the Espionage Act violated their right to freedom
of speech and freedom of the press protected under the First Amendment.  Justice Holmes
delivered the unanimous opinion of the court:
We admit that in many places and in ordinary times the defendants in saying
all that was said in the circular would have been within their constitutional
rights.  But the character of every act depends upon the circumstances in
which it is done.  The most stringent protection of free speech would not
protect a man falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic.  It does
not even protect a man from an injunction against uttering words that may
have all the effect of force.  The question in every case is whether the words
used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a
clear and present danger [emphasis added] that they will bring about the
substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.  It is a question of
proximity and degree.  When a nation is at war many things that might be
said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will
not be endured so long as men fight and that no Court could regard them as
protected by any constitutional right.64
Justice Holmes, as a result of the country being engaged in war, argued that the convictions
ought to stand.  In addition, Justice Holmes established “clear and present danger” as the first
method the United States Supreme Court used to determine whether speech ought to be
protected under the First Amendment.  The clear and present danger doctrine argued that
 Lewis, Freedom for the Thought That We Hate, 23, 25 - 27; Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 4763
(1919); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919).
 Schenck.64
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speech can only be suppressed when harm might immediately take place.  This required a
connection between speech and action.65
Debs and Frohwerk were similar to Schenck.  Debs was convicted under the
Espionage Act as a result of giving a speech construed as anti-war and Frohwerk was
convicted under the Espionage Act as a result of publishing newspaper articles critical of the
war effort.  Both cases resulted in unanimous decisions, based on the same logic as Schenck,
with Justice Holmes delivering the opinion of the court.  Holmes noted:
the First Amendment while prohibiting legislation against free speech as such
cannot have been, and obviously was not, intended to give immunity for
every possible use of language.  We venture to believe that neither Hamilton
nor Madison, nor any other competent person then or later, ever supposed
that to make criminal the counselling of a murder within the jurisdiction of
Congress would be an unconstitutional interference with free speech.66
Following the criteria for clear and present danger, all three cases illustrate the balancing act
the United States Supreme Court has struck with respect to the First Amendment. 
Interestingly, several months later, a shift developed within the Supreme Court.
In November of 1919 a fourth case dealing with the Espionage Act reached the
Supreme Court.  Abrams v. United States involved the conviction of four individuals who
distributed leaflets protesting United States intervention in Russia and the United States
government in general.  Again, the court upheld the conviction, but the decision was not
unanimous.  Both Justice Holmes and Justice Brandeis dissented.  Justice Holmes clarified
and amended his clear and present danger doctrine in his dissent:
 Martin Shapiro, “Clear and Present Danger,” in The First Amendment: Selections from the65
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I never have seen any reason to doubt that the questions of law that alone
were before this Court in the cases of Schenck, Frohwerk and Debs, were
rightly decided.  I do not doubt for a moment that by the same reasoning that
would justify punishing persuasion to murder, the United States
constitutionally may punish speech that produces or is intended to produce
a clear and imminent danger that it will bring about forthwith certain
substantive evils that the United States constitutionally may seek to prevent. 
The power undoubtedly is greater in time of war than in time of peace
because war opens dangers that do not exist at other times.  But as against
dangers peculiar to war, as against others, the principle of the right to free
speech is always the same.  It is only the present danger of immediate evil or
an intent to bring it about that warrants Congress in setting a limit to the
expression of opinion where private rights are not concerned. . . . that the best
test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market . . . I think that we should be eternally vigilant
against attempts to check the expression of opinions that we loathe and
believe to be fraught with death, unless they so imminently threaten
immediate interference with the lawful and pressing purposes of the law that
an immediate check is required to save the country.67
The majority decided the case based on the “bad tendency test.”  This test had roots in
English law and removed the nexus between speech and action established in the clear and
present danger doctrine.  Almost all freedom of speech cases during the next decade lost, as
a result of the bad tendency test being used instead of the clear and present danger doctrine. 
Both Justice Holmes and Justice Brandeis dissented throughout the decade.68
Application of Freedom of Speech to the States
The only victory for freedom of speech during this period occurred in 1925.  Even
though the court did not overrule the conviction in Gitlow v. New York, the majority decided
 Lewis, Freedom for the Thought That We Hate, 28 - 29; Abrams et al. v. United States, 250 U.S.67
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that the free-speech clause of the First Amendment applies to the states as a result of the
Fourteenth Amendment.  Justice Sanford explained:
For present purposes we may and do assume that freedom of speech and of
the press – which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgment by
Congress – are among the fundamental personal rights and “liberties”
protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from
impairment by the States.69
Justice Holmes and Justice Brandeis dissented, but agreed that the First Amendment ought
to apply to the states.  In addition, the court also recognized that the First Amendment applies
to all branches of the government, not just the legislative branch.  From this point on, cases
dealing with freedom of speech generally were based on state repression.70
Development of Freedom of Thought
For the remainder of this enquiry, recognizing that freedom of thought is fundamental
to freedom of speech, the terms are used interchangeably.  Important arguments for the cause
of freedom of thought occurred in both Whitney v. California (1927) and United States v.
Schwimmer (1929).  In Whitney, Justice Brandeis issued a concurring opinion explaining the
importance the Founders placed on freedom of thought:
Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the State was
to make men free to develop their faculties; and that in its government the
deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary.  They valued liberty both
as an ends and as a means.  They believed liberty to be the secret of happiness
and courage to be the secret of liberty.  They believed that the freedom to
think as you will and to speak as you think [emphasis added] are means
indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth; that without free
speech and assembly discussion would be futile; that with them, discussion
 Lewis, Freedom for the Thought That We Hate, 34 -35; Gitlow v. People of New York, 268 U.S.69
652 (1925).
 Lewis, Freedom for the Thought That We Hate, 35; Emerson, “Freedom of Speech,” 20.70
33
affords ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination of noxious
doctrine; that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; that public
discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle
of the American government.  71
In Schwimmer, the dissenting opinion authored by Justice Holmes further supports freedom
of thought.  Justice Holmes explained:
but if there is any principle of the Constitution that more imperatively calls
for attachment than any other it is the principle of free thought – not free
thought for those who agree with us but freedom for the thought that we hate. 
I think we should adhere to that principle with regard to admission into, as
well as to life within this country.72
The opinions in both cases illustrate the importance of freedom of thought for freedom of
speech.
Freedom of Thought Decisions
The first time that the principle of freedom of speech supporting freedom of thought
was enforced on the Supreme Court was in 1931 in the case of Stromberg v. California. 
Stromberg was convicted of violating a California law for displaying a red flag which was
used as symbolic protest against the government.  In a 7 - 2 opinion, the Supreme Court
reversed the decision of the state appellate court that found for the state.  Justice Hughes
wrote:
The maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion to the end
that government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes
may be obtained by lawful means, an opportunity essential to the security of
the Republic, is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system.  A
statute which upon its face, and as authoritatively construed, is so vague and
indefinite as to permit the punishment of the fair use of this opportunity is
 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).71
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repugnant to the guaranty of liberty contained in the Fourteenth
Amendment.73
The clear and present danger doctrine overtook the bad tendency test starting a trend in which
the Supreme Court consistently issued opinions favoring  freedom of thought.
It is important to illustrate this trend through the legal opinion of some of the
prominent cases from this period.  In 1937 the court issued opinions in two cases stemming
primarily from fear of Communism.  In the first case, De Jonge v. Oregon, the defendant was
convicted of violating a state syndicalism law by conducting a meeting sponsored by the
Communist Party.  Justice Hughes issued the majority opinion overturning the conviction. 
Justice Hughes explained:
The greater the importance of safeguarding the community from incitements
to the overthrow of our institutions by force and violence, the more
imperative is the need to preserve inviolate the constitutional rights of free
speech, free press and free assembly in order to maintain the opportunity for
free political discussion, to the end that government may be responsive to the
will of the people and that changes, if desired, may be obtained by peaceful
means.  Therein lies the security of the Republic, the very foundation of
constitutional government.  74
 
In the second case, Herndon v. Lowry, the defendant was convicted of attempting to incite
resurrection through the Communist Party.  Justice Roberts issued the opinion explaining,
“The power of a state to abridge freedom of speech and of assembly is the exception rather
than the rule and the penalizing even of utterances of a defined character must find its
 Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931).73
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justification in a reasonable apprehension of danger to organized government.”   Both cases75
provided further justification for freedom of thought.
The Court continued advocating a clear role for freedom of thought in American
society in the case of Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940).  This involved the arrest of several
members of the Jehovah’s Witnesses religion.  They were going door to door in a Catholic
neighborhood distributing information.  Justice Roberts, illustrating the importance of
freedom of thought, noted in his opinion that the First Amendment, “embraces two concepts,
– freedom to believe and freedom to act.  The first is absolute.”76
A landmark 1943 United States Supreme Court decision, West Virginia v. Barnette,
illustrates the importance of freedom of thought for freedom of speech.  This case involved
students who were expelled from school for refusing to salute the flag.  Justice Jackson,
writing for the majority explained:
One’s right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom
of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted
to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.  . . . If there is any fixed
star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other
matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith
therein.  If there are any circumstances which permit an exception, they do
not now occur to us.77
During the 1950s, the clear and present danger doctrine would be amended to a clear and
probable danger standard favoring a balancing test to determine the constitutionality of
speech/thought.
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Balancing Test
During what historians often refer to as the Second Red Scare, clear and present
danger would be abandoned in favor of a balancing test.  The balancing test recognizes the
protections under the First Amendment are not absolute.  In Dennis v. United States (1951)
the court decided that the interests of national security outweighed those of freedom of
speech.  Justice Frankfurter issued a concurring opinion explaining:
It is not for us to decide how we would adjust the clash of interests which this
case presents were the primary responsibility for reconciling it ours. 
Congress has determined that the danger created by advocacy of overthrow
justifies the ensuing restriction on freedom of speech.  The determination was
made after due deliberation . . . In the light of their experience, the Framers
of the Constitution chose to keep the judiciary dissociated from direct
participation in the legislative process . . . When legislation touches freedom
of thought and freedom of speech, such a tendency is a formidable enemy of
the free spirit.  Much that should be rejected as illiberal, because repressive
and envenoming, may well be not unconstitutional.78
Justice Frankfurter concluded that it was legitimate for Congress to conclude that national
security was more important than protecting speech/thought in this particular situation.
On the other hand, in Yates v. United States (1957), the Supreme Court drew the line
on the other side, supporting freedom of speech/thought over national security.  Justice
Harlan composed the majority opinion arguing that the District Court misinterpreted Dennis. 
Justice Harlan explains, “In failing to distinguish between advocacy of forcible overthrow
as an abstract doctrine and advocacy of action to that end, the District Court appears to have
been led astray by the holding in Dennis that advocacy of violent action to be taken as some
 Martin Shapiro, “Balancing Test,” in The First Amendment: Selections from the Encyclopedia of78
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future time was enough.”   The Court’s use of the balancing test in this case distinguished79
between the “advocacy of abstract doctrine and advocacy of action.”   Contemporary United80
States Supreme Court decisions seem to have settled on the “Brandenburg test” with respect
to freedom of speech/thought cases.
Brandenburg Test
The current test used to determine the constitutionality of speech/thought, the
Brandenburg test, was established in the landmark 1969 United States Supreme Court case
Brandenburg v. Ohio.   The defendant was a leader of the area Ku Klux Klan and convicted81
of violating an Ohio syndicalism law resulting from a speech the defendant made later aired
on a television news program.  The United States Supreme Court issued an unusual per
curium opinion and overturned the conviction.  The opinion explained:
the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a
State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation
except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action. . . . A statute
which fails to draw this distinction impermissibly intrudes upon the freedoms
guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.  It sweeps within its
condemnation speech which our Constitution has immunized from
governmental control.82
The Brandenburg test is a two-prong test.  In order to suppress speech, it is not enough that
the speech incites criminal activity, the speech must also be likely to produce the said action. 
When considering whether contemporary freedom of speech/thought ought to be suppressed,
 Yates et al. v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957).79
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it is instructive to consider the requirements of the Brandenburg test since it appears that the
United States Supreme Court has settled on this test.
Summary
In this chapter a historical analysis of freedom of thought was presented.  The chapter
began with the purpose of American public education and the connection between freedom
of thought and freedom of speech.  Four different rationales for freedom of speech were
discussed including the argument from the perspective of truth, the argument from the
perspective of democracy, the argument for the good life, and the argument for individuality. 
The history of freedom of thought was discussed from Ancient Greece to the Brandenburg
test.  For the purposes of this enquiry the ideal of freedom of thought and freedom of speech
will based on the above mentioned Brandenburg test. 
Chapter 3
Political Judgement from Protagoras to Locke
The faculty of judging; ability to form an opinion; that function of the mind whereby it
arrives at a notion of anything; the critical faculty; discernment.1
-Oxford English Dictionary
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to further provide the context necessary to understand
this Critical Enquiry.  This Critical Enquiry is concerned with whether the practice of
government mandated standardized achievement tests of knowledge in American public
schools is consistent with the type of education necessary for citizens to exercise their right
to freedom of thought in order to make informed political judgements.  The following two
chapters are a survey of the history of political judgement. Political judgement from
Protagoras to Locke is discussed in this chapter and political judgement from Montesquieu
to Rawls is discussed in Chapter 4. 
Protagoras
Protagoras (ca. 490 - ca. 420 BCE) is arguably the most well known of the Sophists. 
The Sophists were Greek philosophers who charged a fee to educate citizens on a wide
 Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed., s.v. “Judgement.”1
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variety of topics.  Aside from a few quotations, little of the work of Protagoras has stood the
test of time.   His most famous quote, from his work referred to as “Truth” or “Throws,” and2
referenced in Plato’s Theaetetus is, “Man is the measure of all things: of the things which
are, that they are, and of the things which are not, that they are not.”   Protagoras believed3
that all truths are internal and that there is no such thing as an objective reality.  Political
judgement, for Protagoras, rests entirely with each and every individual.  Plato delineates a
system of political judgement completely opposite from Protagoras in that “Truth” is outside
of the individual.
Plato
Plato (427 - 347 BCE), an Athenian philosopher who studied under Socrates (469 -
399 BCE),  composed numerous works on a variety of subjects.  Many were written in a
dialogue in which Socrates was the central character.  Plato eventually founded the Academy,
a school devoted to philosophy, in which his most famous student, Aristotle (384 - 322
BCE), studied.   Plato’s three major political philosophical works are the Republic,  the4 5
Statesman,  and the Laws.   In Plato’s Republic, Socrates discusses political judgement while6 7
 Much of what is known about Protagoras comes from Plato.2
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contemplating the notion of justice.  Socrates locates political judgement during a discussion
of the four virtues which are wisdom, civic courage, moderation, and justice.  Positioning
judgement in the realm of wisdom, Socrates notes that, “good judgment, is clearly some kind
of knowledge, for it’s through knowledge, not ignorance, that people judge well.”   This8
power to judge, in Socrates’s ideal city, rests with a minority at the top of the social hierarchy
referred to as the guardians.  Socrates notes that the guardians, “must eagerly pursue what
is advantageous to the city and be wholly unwilling to do the opposite.”   By acting as judge,9
the guardians must issue political judgements that are just, which for Socrates means, “that
no citizen should have what belongs to another or be deprived of what is his own.”   It is10
necessary to note that Socrates believes that justice, under the virtue of wisdom, is based on
knowledge not opinion.   The Athenian, in the Laws, best explains the importance of11
knowledge arguing, “Knowledge is unsurpassed by any law or regulation; reason, if it is
genuine and really enjoys its natural freedom, should have universal power.”12
Similar to Socrates, in the Republic, the Visitor, in the Statesman, argues that the best
form of government necessitates a ruler that holds expert knowledge and is above the law.  13
Political judgement rests with this expert statesman.  The Visitor explains, “for wise rulers,
whatever they do, provided that they watch for one great thing, that by always distributing
 Plato, Republic, 428a - 430d.8
 Plato, Republic, 412e.9
 Plato, Republic, 433e.10
 Plato, Republic, 480a.11
 Plato, Laws, 875c - 875d.12
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to those in the city what is most just, as judged by the intelligent application of their
expertise.”   The Athenian, consistent with both the Visitor and Socrates, points out, “where14
supreme power in a man joins hands with wise judgment and self-restraint, there you have
the birth of the best political system.”   In order to exercise the position of ruler, both15
Socrates and the Athenian discuss the importance of education.  Socrates believes that this
education system should eliminate any possible exposure to injustice and the Athenian
believes this education system should be based on virtue in the hope of creating the ideal
citizen.   The Athenian notes, “education has proved to be a process of attraction, of leading16
children to accept right principles as enunciated by the law and endorsed as genuinely correct
by men who have high moral standards and are full of years and experience.”         17
Practically, Socrates is skeptical that this ideal city could come to fruition.  Socrates
notes that it will not occur, “Until philosophers rule as kings or those who are now called
kings and leading men genuinely and adequately philosophize, that is, until political power
and philosophy entirely coincide.”   He describes the philosopher king as, “A noble and well18
brought-up character, for example, kept down by exile, who remains with philosophy
according to his nature because there is no one to corrupt him, or a great soul living in a
small city, who disdains the city’s affairs and looks beyond them.”  Socrates distinguishes19
 Plato, Statesman, 297a - 297b.14
 Plato, Laws, 712a.15
 Plato, Republic, 376d - 412b; Plato, Laws, 643e.16
 Plato, Laws, 659d.17
 Plato, Republic, 473c - 473d.18
 Plato, Republic, 496a - 496b.19
43
between knowledge and opinion creating a four-level hierarchy that correlates to the four
levels of the soul.  These include, from the bottom up, imagination, belief, thought, and
understanding.  It is only the philosopher kings that are able to apprehend truth at its highest
form, the good.   Socrates describes this acquisition through the well-known allegory of the20
cave.
In order to recognize where Plato situates political judgement, it is important to
revisit his allegory of the cave.  In this story Socrates paints the picture of a group of chained
prisoners  living in a cave since they were young and unable to move their heads.  A fire
behind them, that they are unable to see, projects shadows on the wall in front of them.  The
humans assume that the shadows are the truth.  Socrates continues by imagining that one of
the prisoners was able to escape from the cave and see the real truth.  He uses this story as
a metaphor for the education necessary for a philosopher king, culminating with the highest
form of truth, the good, learned through dialectic.  The philosopher king must then
metaphorically travel back into the cave in order to rule the prisoners since they are the only
one that possesses truth.  Socrates explains that the philosopher king will:
see vastly better than the people [prisoners] there.  And because you’ve
[philosopher king] seen the truth about fine, just, and good things, you’ll
[philosopher king] know each image for what it is and also that of which it
is the image.  Thus, for you and for us, the city will be governed, not like the
majority of cities nowadays, by people who fight over shadows and struggle
against one another in order to rule–as if that were a great good–but by people
who are awake rather than dreaming.21
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The allegory of the cave is consistent with the perspective of the Athenian when he argues
that the people must constantly be ruled by someone and never make any individual
decision.   The Athenian says, “trust whatever the legislator tells us . . . the most respectable22
ideas will be those of the legislator.”   Departing from political judgement based on23
knowledge is Aristotle.
Aristotle
Aristotle (384 - 322 BCE), a Greek philosopher, initially studied under Plato at the
Academy.  At one time he tutored Alexander the Great before founding the Lyceum, his own
school devoted to the study of philosophy.   Considering political judgement to be part of24
the practical sciences, and as a result the inability to positively establish the truth of politics,
Aristotle’s viewpoint in his Nicomachean Ethics  is in sharp contrast to Plato’s notion of25
political judgement based strictly on knowledge.  Politics, for Aristotle, involves striving for
happiness.  Aristotle describes someone who has achieved happiness as, “one who exercises
his faculties in accordance with perfect excellence [virtue], being duly furnished with
external goods, not for any chance time, but for a full term of years . . . and who shall
continue to live so, and shall die as he lived.”   The individual who has achieved happiness26
is consistent with Aristotle’s notion of the ideal statesman interested in virtue.27
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Aristotle defines virtue as, “a habit or trained faculty of choice, the characteristic of
which lies in moderation or observance of the mean relatively to the persons concerned, as
determined by reason, i.e., by the reason by which the prudent man would determine it.”28
This determination, or deliberation for Aristotle involves, “matters in which there are rules
that generally hold good, but in which the result cannot be predicted, i.e., in which there is
an element of uncertainty.  In important matters we call in advisers, distrusting our own
powers of judgment.”   Aristotle notes, “for the good or ideal man judges each case29
correctly, and in each case what is true seems true to him.”   The criteria to determine30
judgement is justice.  Justice consists of being fair and consistent with the law.  But Aristotle
does not necessarily believe that the law is absolute, rather it is signified in generalities and
does not necessarily fit each individual case.  It is then the role of the judge to make a
political judgement based on the notion of justice.31
In order to make the right judgement, according to Aristotle, the judge must have both
superior moral and intellectual virtue.  This requires prudence since this virtue involves the
realm of opinion.  Aristotle discusses the importance of prudence for judgement noting that
prudence:
deals with human affairs, and with matters that admit of deliberation: for the
prudent man’s special function, as we conceive it, is to deliberate well; but
no one deliberates about what is invariable, or about matters in which there
is not some end, in the sense of some realizable good.  But a man is said to
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deliberate well (without any qualifying epithet) when he is able, by a process
of reasoning or calculation, to arrive at what is best for man in matters of
practice.32
In Politics,  Aristotle discusses three major types of government, but unlike Plato, Aristotle33
does not profess which type of government makes the ideal state.  
Aristotle distinguishes forms of government based on how many govern.  These
include a kingship in which one rules, an aristocracy in which a few rule, and a constitutional
government in which many rule.  Consistent with Aristotle’s position in Nicomachean
Ethics, the ideal city, like the ideal man, should be virtuous.  As a result, Aristotle believes
that best city has a majority of citizens from the middle class to prevent either extreme, the
rich or the poor, from dominating.  Aristotle describes the virtuous state as:
the happy state may be shown to be that which is best and which acts rightly:
and it cannot act rightly without doing right actions, and neither individual
nor state can do right actions without excellence and wisdom.  Thus the
courage, justice, and wisdom of a state have the same form and nature as the
qualities which give the individual who possesses them the name of just,
wise, or temperate.34
As a result, for Aristotle, the ideal state best ensures that each citizen is able to pursue
happiness.35
Not all individuals in the state are considered citizens.  Classes of individuals
excluded include artisans and tradesman since they have no deliberative role in the
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government.  For Aristotle, only the citizens should own land and take part in the decision
making apparatus of government.  To ensure that citizens possess the intellectual and moral 
virtue, discussed above, necessary to make appropriate judgements, Aristotle argues that
citizens should be provided an education designed to support the particular form of
government in place.   Moving away from Aristotle and back towards an absolute notion of36
judgement is Marcus Tullius Cicero.
Cicero
Cicero (106 - 43 BCE), a Roman politician, was most famous for bringing the
Hellenistic philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, among others, to a Latin audience.   Cicero’s37
two major political works are the Republic and the Laws.  In the dialogue of the Republic,38
Cicero uses Scipio Africanus, a historical Roman statesman, as the major character
discussing the ideal type of government.  Scipio distinguishes between three simple forms
of government.  These include a monarchy, an aristocracy, and a democracy.  Scipio,
disliking all three simple forms of government, describes the general change in political
power as, “Tyrants snatch it from kings; aristocrats or the people wrest it from them; and
from them it moves to oligarchic cliques or back to tyrants.  The same type of constituition
never retains power for long.”   When pressed, Scipio believes that of those three forms of39
government the monarchy is the best, but Scipio argues that the best form of government is
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a combination of the three simple forms of government.  Scipio describes this ideal state as,
“A state should possess an element of regal supremacy; something else should be assigned
and allotted to the authority of aristocrats; and certain affairs should be reserved for the
judgement and desires of the masses.”   While it seems that Cicero, based on the ideas of40
Scipio, believes that ideal political judgement varies since he believes in a mixed
government, the Laws   illustrates a view of political judgement must more consistent with41
Plato.
 Cicero defines his notion of the law.  Cicero says, “law is a force of nature, the
intelligence and reason of a wise man, and the criterion of justice and injustice.”   Cicero42
believes that justice is not based in the practical realm of opinion, but based exclusively on
nature, a position much more consistent with Plato and his ideal forms.  Cicero describes
justice:
There is one, single, justice.  It binds together human society and has been
established by one, single law.  That law is right reason in commanding and
forbidding.  A man who does not acknowledge this law is unjust, whether it
has been written down anywhere or not.  . . . That is why justice is completely
non-existent if it is not derived from nature.”43
Nature is what enables one to distinguish good from bad, justice from injustice, and what is
honorable from what is dishonorable.  Cicero further notes that nature implants this
understanding of virtue and vice into the minds of humans.  Cicero explains, “law was not
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thought up by the intelligence of human beings, nor is it some kind of resolution passed by
communities, but rather an eternal force which rules the world by the wisdom of its
commands and prohibitions.”   Cicero explains that it is the wise man who has developed44
the reason necessary to establish the law based on nature.   Similar to Cicero’s notion of45
judgement, but aligned with the Christian religious tradition is Augustine.
Augustine
Augustine (354 - 430 CE), bishop of Hippo and Christian theologian, was significant
in that he was the first to combine, with numerous modifications, the Greek philosophy of
Plato with the Christian religion.   Augustine differentiates between the spiritual and46
material world in The City of God  illustrating a political judgement based on the divine47
judgement of God.  Augustine distinguishes in the text between the city of man and the city
of God, in which justice only exists in the later.  In a rebuke to the Greek philosophers,
Augustine argues that it is only through divine assistance that the truth can be discovered. 
He also explains, “the whole connection and train of causes which makes everything become
what it does become . . . the will and power of God most high, who is most rightly and most
truly believed to know all things before they come to pass, and to leave nothing
unordained.”   In the political philosophy of Augustine, all truth rests outside of humanity48
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in the divine realm of God and is more just and wise than anything that could be created in
the human world.49
While Augustine challenges many of the ideas of Greek philosophy, he is partial to
the work of Plato and believes that many of the ideas of Plato are consistent with the notion
of God.  He describes Plato and philosophers consistent with Plato as, “these, by knowing
God, have found where resides the cause by which the universe has been constituted, and the
light by which truth is to be discovered, and the fountain at which felicity is to be drunk.”  50
Augustine, consistent with Plato, in that political judgement is based on knowledge, argues
that man ought to live a life according to the spiritual and not the material in order live the
life of truth based on faith. 
Ultimate judgement rests with God, according to Augustine.  He explains the position
of the church with respect to judgement:
the whole church of the true God holds and professes as its creed, that Christ
shall come from heaven to judge quick and dead, this we call the last day, or
last time of divine judgement.  . . . even now God judges, and has judged
from the beginning of human history . . . but he also judges the voluntary and
personal acts of individuals51
In a sense, judgement under Augustine is non-existent, the only place judgement rests is with
God.  According to Augustine, God’s judgement will occur both in the human world and the
spiritual world.   Augustine notes that God possesses the greatest wisdom, virtue, and justice52
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and that all of God’s judgements are just.   Another important Christian theologian, albeit53
one who privileges Aristotle instead of Plato, is Thomas Aquinas.
Thomas Aquinas
Aquinas (1225 - 1274 CE), like Augustine, attempted to unite philosophy and
theology.  The major significance in the work of Aquinas is the establishment of  a
Aristotelean  philosophy in the Christian West.   In Aquinas’s work, On Kingship,  he54 55
follows the Aristotelean practice of distinguishing between theory and practice in his
discussion of a monarch.  Aquinas begins by describing humans as “social and political
animals” who need to be directed as a group to a “common good” by some type of
government.   The most just type of government, according to Aquinas, is that of the king,56
the most unjust type of government is that of the tyrant.  He describes the king as, “one man
who is chief and that he be a shepherd seeking the common good of the multitude and not
his own.”   While it initially seems that Aquinas believes that political judgement rests with57
the king, further inspection leads to a different conclusion.
Aquinas later describes the king as a servant to God in his rule over the people.  The
reward for the king is not presented in the material world, but in heaven for eternity.  This
provides the incentive for the king to ensure that he is ruling justly and not as a tyrant. 
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Aquinas denotes the role of the king as, “first of all, to establish a virtuous life in the
multitude subject to him; second, to preserve it once established; and third, having preserved
it, to promote its greater perfection.”   And in order to ensure that the king is consistent with58
his role as a servant of God, Aquinas argues that the king ought to be subservient to the
priests.   As a result, political judgement is not based in the material world, but is based59
outside of humanity.
For Aquinas, it would be impossible for political judgement to be housed with the
king, since the king is not subject to the full understanding of what constitutes truth.
Absolute knowledge can only be known by God.  Aquinas describes truth as, “God’s justice,
which establishes things in the order conformable to the rule of His wisdom, which is the law
of His justice.”   God is necessary in the realm of political judgement because humans lack60
the ability to form exact judgements.  Aquinas explains:
on account of the uncertainty of human judgment, especially on contingent
and particular matters, different people form different judgments on human
acts; whence also different and contrary laws result.  In order, therefore, that
man may know without any doubt what he ought to do and what he ought to
avoid, it was necessary for man to be directed in his proper acts by a law
given by God, for it is certain that such a law cannot err.61
In the end, according to Aquinas, all judgement, including political judgement, rests with
God when he conducts the last judgement in which both the body and soul are judged for
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eternity.   This survey continues with a look at Niccolò Machiavelli and a political62
judgement based on practice.
Niccolò Machiavelli
Machiavelli (1469 - 1527 CE), an Italian political philosopher, is most readily
identified for his classic text The Prince.   In it, Machiavelli recognizes two basic forms of63
government.  A state is either governed as a principality, the focus of The Prince, or a
republic.  In his famous book, Machiavelli describes the “science” of how to rule a state.  The
most important aspect of managing a state is being able to conduct a war.  According to
Machiavelli, this should be the chief focus of any successful ruler.  The maintenance of the
state is the criteria used to determine the successful prince.  While the prince ought to listen
to advisors, political judgement rests solely with the ruler.  Machiavelli, while still
recognizing the divine, moves away from Aquinas arguing that man can govern and that not
everything is determined by God.   The above account represents the traditional and64
contemporary understanding of “Machiavellian” politics, but further reading presents a 
different account of political judgement.
Machiavelli presents a republican form of political judgement in The Discourses.  65
Essentially, a republican form of government, consists of mixing the various other types of
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government.  These other governments include a principality, an aristocracy, and a
democracy.  As a result, the three basic parts of a republican government are a regal power,
an elite influence, and a popular government.  Combining all three elements creates a more
stable government, according to Machiavelli.  He also notes that a government is much more
stable when the citizens consent to it and are religious since they then possess virtue. 
Machiavelli explains the importance of different governmental elements at different times. 
He argues that while democratic institutions are critical to a healthy republic, there are times
where it is necessary to have some type of power authorized to make quick and appropriate
decisions.   66
Machiavelli, in sharp contrast to popular opinion,  supports a republic over a67
principality.  He argues, “For when the populace is in power and is well-ordered, it will be
stable, prudent and grateful, in much the same way, or in a better way, than is a prince,
however wise he be thought. . . . It is found, too, that in the election of magistrates the
populace makes a far better choice than does the prince.”   Political judgement, for68
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Machiavelli, depends on the situation at hand.  It is neither located absolutely in nature, the
divine or in the hands of the king, but also in the hands of everyday people.  For Machiavelli,
politics is much more a practice than a theory.  The next philosopher, Francis Bacon, argues
that political judgement ought to be based on science.      
Francis Bacon
Bacon (1561 - 1626 CE) was an English philosopher who privileged science in his
search for truth.  His empiricism is developed in New Atlantis,  a utopian novel that69
concludes with political judgement in the state ultimately being based on scientific research.
Bacon begins the story describing a ship that was lost at sea that encounters a previously
unknown island called Bensalem.  Initially, the island’s inhabitants refused to allow the crew
to land; but after taking an oath, the crew was permitted on land and escorted to what was
called the Strangers’ House for an initial quarantine.  During this quarantine, the crew
conversed with several village leaders.  Of particular importance was the discussion of
Salomon’s House with the Father of Salomon’s House.     70
Salomon’s House was established as an institution for the study of the world with the
explicit purpose of “finding out of the true nature of all things.”   Operations of Salomon’s71
House include launching expeditions to states throughout the world in order to bring back
various books of knowledge, compiling the new knowledge, conducting experiments,
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analyzing the results of experiments, synthesizing the results of experiments, and amending
experiments based on the results.  The Father of Salomon’s House notes:
we have consultations, which of the inventions and experiences which we
have discovered shall be published, and which not: and take all an oath of
secrecy, for the concealing of those which we think fit to keep secret: though
some of those we do reveal sometimes to the state and some not.   72
Essentially, Saloman’s House conducts scientific research and controls the dissemination of
information.  As a result, political judgement rests with this group since the government is
subservient to Saloman’s House due to the restrictive nature of knowledge on the island. 
Political judgement moves back from science to the sole control of a monarch with Thomas
Hobbes.
Thomas Hobbes
Hobbes (1588 - 1679 CE) was an English philosopher.  In his major work of political
philosophy, the Leviathan,  Hobbes describes man in a hypothetical original state of nature73
before the creation of the state.  Hobbes describes man in this state as equal to every other
man, but at the same time living in constant fear of each other.  Hobbes describes the state
of nature as:
where every man is enemy to every man; the same is consequent to the time,
wherein men live without other security, than what their own strength, and
their own invention shall furnish them withal.  In such condition, there is no
place for industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain; and consequently no
culture of the earth; no navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be
imported by sea; no commodious building; no instruments of moving, and
removing such things as requires much force; no knowledge of the face of the
earth; no account of time; no arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst
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of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man,
solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.74
Hobbes continues by explaining that in the state of nature, concepts such as morality and
ethics do not exist since there is no law.   Since it is impossible to have any semblance of75
peace in the original state of nature, Hobbes formulates the notion of the social contract.
Through the social contract, men abandon all of their individual rights absolutely. 
The state is created in order to ensure that men keep to their agreement and provide for the
safety of the people.  Hobbes explains, “the nature of justice, consisteth in keeping of valid
covenants: but the validity of covenants begins not but with the constitution of a civil power,
sufficient to compel men to keep them.”   Hobbes favors a monarch to ensure the76
effectiveness of the social contract.  He explains, “The only way to erect such a common
power . . . is, to confer all their power and strength upon one man, or upon one assembly of
men, that may reduce all their wills, by plurality of voices, unto one will.”   Advantages of77
a monarch, according to Hobbes, include the alignment of both private and public interests,
the ability to confer with others at leisure, and the lack of disagreement between faring
factions based on self-interest.  Also, since the monarch has sole power in determining a
successor, power can be transferred without issue.  In addition, Hobbes argues that the
people, once making the social contract, have no right to abandon the agreement.78
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In this form of government, all political judgement rests with the sovereign monarch. 
Hobbes summarizes the power of the monarch as:
His power cannot, without his consent, be transferred to another: he cannot
forfeit it: he cannot be accused by any of his subjects, of injury: he cannot be
punished by them: he is judge of what is necessary for peace; and judge of
doctrines: he is sole legislator; and supreme judge of controversies; and of the
times, and occasions of war, and peace: to him belongeth to choose
magistrates, counsellors, commanders, and all other officers, and ministers;
and to determine of rewards, and punishments, honor, and order.79
Private judgement does not exist.  Judgement rests solely and completely with the monarch. 
Hobbes believes that although their might be negatives with respect to an absolute monarch,
they are not anywhere close to the problems man experiences in the original state of nature.  80
René Descartes provides an entirely different notion of political judgement.
René Descartes
Descartes (1596 - 1650 CE), from France, was best known for his work in philosophy
and mathematics.  Descartes believes that one must start from first principles and then
establish new knowledge based on it.   Descartes, in Discourse on Method  and Meditations81 82
on First Philosophy,  describes his methodology utilized in order to pursue truth.  He begins83
by arguing that men have an equal capacity for judging the true from the false, but that some
men do not use this ability appropriately.  In addition, Descartes believes that most men form
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opinion based on custom rather than knowledge.  In an attempt to ascertain truth at the most
basic level, Descartes, following in the tradition of the skeptics, attempts to determine truth
at a foundational level and then to build from there.84
As a firm foundation which Descartes does not believe can be denied, Descartes
establishes as his basic truth, “I think, therefore I am (COGITO ERGO SUM).”   Descartes85
believes that it is impossible to doubt that he exists since he has a mind and is able to think. 
He continues by noting that since he can think of perfection, God must also exist.  After
arguing for the existence of God, Descartes establishes other truths outside of reality such
as geometry.   From these basic truths, Descartes continues developing more complex truths.86
Of particular importance is Descartes assertion that truth exists outside humans. 
Descartes explains:
And what I here find of most importance is, that I discover in my mind
innumerable ideas of certain objects . . . which are not framed by me though
it may be in my power to think, or not to think them, but possess true and
immutable natures of their own.  As, for example, when I imagine a triangle,
although there is not perhaps and never was in any place in the universe apart
from my thought one such figure, it remains true nevertheless that this figure
possesses a certain determinate nature, form, or essence, which is immutable
and eternal, and not framed by me, nor in any degree dependent on my
thought.87
It is through reason that humans can determine what constitutes truth and, as a result,
political judgement.  Descartes notes, “all that is necessary to right action is right judgment,
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and to the best action the most correct judgment.”   The next philosopher, John Milton,88
combines an argument for both individual political judgement and freedom of speech.
John Milton
Milton (1608 - 1674 CE),  while best known for his poetry, contributed significantly89
to political philosophy.  At base, Milton believes that political judgement rests with each and
every citizen in the state.  Milton argues that humans in the original state of nature were free
until Adam committed the original sin.  Afterwards, it became necessary for humans to join
in groups, creating cities and nations, in order to protect themselves.  A single individual or
group of individuals were selected to ensure that justice was carried out.  Milton believes that
this should still hold true.  Milton explains:
since the king or magistrate holds his authority of the people, both originally
and naturally for their good in the first place, and not his own, then may the
people, as oft as they shall judge it for the best, either choose him or reject
him, retain him or depose him, though no tyrant, merely by the liberty and
right of free-born men to be governed as seems to them best.90
Milton continues, “justice is the only true sovereign and supreme majesty upon earth.”   As91
a result, Milton supports a free commonwealth.
Milton believes that a free commonwealth is the best form of government as opposed
to a monarch.  In this type of government, the people have the duty to select a group to meet
and make decisions for the good of the country.  In order to ensure that citizens can make
 Descartes, Discourse on Method, 28.88
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those political judgements, Milton is a proponent of revising the education system.  92
Political judgement, for Milton, rests with each individual.  Benedict De Spinoza, the next
philosopher, also supports political judgement resting with the individual.
Benedict De Spinoza
Spinoza (1632 - 1677 CE) was a Dutch philosopher and key theorist within the
rationalist circle.  Originally born Baruch, Spinoza opted for the Latin Benedict and was later
excommunicated for his views which were deemed contrary to the Jewish faith.   In his93
Theological-Political Treatise,  Spinoza argues that philosophy and religion are two distinct94
groups of discourse.  As a result, there is no dispute between them nor should one be
dependent upon the other.  Spinoza explains that the purpose of religion is to, “teach
obedience [to the moral law] . . . It teaches that the entire Law consists in just one thing,
namely love of one's neighbour.”   Philosophy, on the other hand, is concerned with truth. 95
Spinoza further explains:
anyone who tries to accommodate the Bible to philosophy will undoubtedly
ascribe to the prophets many things that they did not imagine even in their
dreams and will construe their meaning wrongly.  On the other hand, anyone
who makes reason and philosophy the servant of theology will be obliged to
accept as divinely inspired the prejudices of the common people of antiquity
 John Milton, Of Education, in The Major Works, ed. Stephen Orgel and Jonathan Goldberg,92
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 229; John Milton, The Ready and Easy Way to Establish a Free
Commonwealth, in The Major Works, ed. Stephen Orgel and Jonathan Goldberg, (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2003), 335 - 339, 343.
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and let his mind be taken over and clouded by them.  Thus both will proceed
senselessly, albeit the latter without reason and the former with it.96
As a result, Spinoza makes the point, one can not use “mathematical proofs” to justify
religion.
Spinoza argues that the best form of government is a democracy.  He explains that 
in the original state of nature, before society, humans are not able to accomplish much since
they are not able to work together.  In addition, humans are ruled by emotions and not reason. 
Because of this it is beneficial to form a government and create laws to prevent humans from
being dominated by their emotions.  As a result, humans turn over their right to individual
action, but not any right with respect to freedom of speech.  The most important duty of the
state is to protect the citizens and provide freedom.  In a democracy, the sovereign is
collective and the best laws are created based on reason.97
Spinoza is also a supporter of freedom of speech and believes that this is a right
which can not be handed over to the state absolutely, unless the state is to become unjust. 
Spinoza explains:
No one, therefore, can surrender their freedom to judge and to think as they
wish and everyone, by the supreme right of nature, remains master of their
own thoughts. . . . Hence, a government which denies each person freedom
to speak and to communicate what they think, will be a very violent
government whereas a state where everyone is conceded this freedom will be
moderate.98
 Spinoza, Theological-Political Treatise, 184, 186.96
 Spinoza, Theological-Political Treatise, 72 - 73, 196, 200 - 201, 242, 252.97
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Political judgement rests with the individual since they ought never relinquish the right to
freedom of speech.  John Locke echoes a similar version of political judgement.
John Locke
Locke (1632 - 1704 CE)  is most famous for his work of political philosophy, Two99
Treatises of Government.   In this text, Locke portrays a positive painting, contrary to100
Hobbes, of humans in the original state of nature noting that it is both a “state of perfect
freedom” and a “state also of equality.”   Although man is free in the original state of101
nature, man also has to continually worry about protecting his rights since not everyone
follows the same notion of justice.  As a result, Locke believes that it is advantageous to
leave the original state of nature and form a government in order to protect this freedom. 
Locke explains:
Man being born, as has been proved, with a title to perfect freedom, and
uncontrolled enjoyment of all the rights and privileges of the law of nature,
equally with any other man, or number of men in the world, hath by nature
a power, not only to preserve his property, that is, his life, liberty, and estate,
against the injuries and attempts of other men; but to judge of and punish the
breaches of that law in others . . . But because no political society can be, nor
subsist, without having in itself the power to preserve the property, and, in
order thereunto, punish the offenses of all those of that society; there, and
there only is political society, where every one of the members hath quitted
this natural power, resigned it up into the hands of the community . . . the
community comes to be umpire . . . Those who are united into one body, and
have a common established law and judicature to appeal to, with authority to
 John Locke’s views on freedom of thought were discussed in Chapter 2.99
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decide controversies between them, and punish offenders, are in civil society
one with another.102
Locke believes that a democracy is the best form of government to ensure that human
freedom is protected.
In order to administer the government in accordance with the will of the majority and
to ensure the continuation and good of the state, Locke argues for the creation of a legislative
power and for this power to be supreme.  He argues that the legislative power should be
given to multiple citizens to ensure that the good of the state is considered and that everyone
is treated equal under the law.  In addition, Locke believes that an executive power should
be created, separate from the legislative power, for the purpose of enforcing the laws and that
a federative power should be created with the purpose of foreign relations.   While the103
legislative power is supreme within the government, the people are ultimately sovereign.
Locke believes that the people have a right, in some circumstances, to overthrow the
government.  Locke explains:
whenever the legislators endeavour to take away and destroy the property of
the people, or to reduce them to slavery under arbitrary power, they put
themselves into a state of war with the people, who are thereupon absolved
from any further obedience, and are left to the common refuge, which God
hath provided for all men, against force and violence.  Whensoever therefore
the legislative shall transgress this fundamental rule of society; and either by
ambition, fear, folly, or corruption, endeavour to grasp themselves, or put into
the hands of any other, an absolute power over the lives, liberties, and estates
of the people; by this breach of trust they forfeit the power the people had put
into their hands for quite contrary ends, and it devolves to the people, who
have a right to resume their original liberty, and, by the establishment of a
 Locke, Two Treatises of Government, 123 - 124, 136 - 137, 154 - 155.102
 Locke, Two Treatises of Government, 142, 158 - 159, 163 - 166.103
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new legislative, (such as they shall think fit) provide for their own safety and
security, which is the end for which they are in society.104
Locke refutes those who argue that states would be constantly under a state of rebellion.  He
argues that revolutions do not happen over little matters.  Locke notes this will only happen
when a “long train of abuses, prevarications, and artifices, all lending the same way, make
the design visible to the people . . . that they should then rouse themselves, and endeavour
to put the rule into such hands which may secure to them the ends for which government was
at first erected . . . the good of mankind.”   Locke’s notion of political judgement, while105
similar to Spinoza, extends farther by advocating that citizens have the right to overthrow
the government in some circumstances. 
Summary
This chapter is the first part of a two-chapter survey of the history of political
judgement.  Protagoras situates political judgement inside individuals.  According to Plato,
political judgement, based on knowledge, rests outside the individual.  Aristotle, in a
significant shift, situates political judgement within the realm of practical sciences and urges
citizens to become virtuous in order to make appropriate judgements.  Both Cicero and
Augustine move political judgement back outside the individual with Cicero placing political
judgement with the wise man and Augustine situating political judgement with God. 
Aquinas also places political judgement with God, but privileges Aristotle instead of Plato. 
Political judgement for Machiavelli depends on the situation and is a practical determination. 
 Locke, Two Treatises of Government, 197.104
 Locke, Two Treatises of Government, 199, 201.105
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Bacon privileges science in determining political judgement while Hobbes favors an absolute
monarch.  Descartes believes that reason can be used to determine truth and thus the
appropriate political judgement.  Milton, Spinoza, and Locke situate political judgement with
the individual.
Chapter 4
Political Judgement from Montesquieu to Rawls
The formation of an opinion or notion concerning something by exercising the mind upon
it; an opinion, estimate.1
-Oxford English Dictionary
Introduction
The purpose of this Critical Enquiry is to examine whether the practice of
government mandated standardized achievement tests of knowledge in American public
schools is consistent with the type of education necessary for citizens to exercise their right
to freedom of thought in order to make informed political judgements.  As stated previously,
this chapter is necessary to understand the contextual nature of this study.  Chapter 3 was a
survey of political judgement beginning with Protagoras and ending with Locke.  This
chapter continues the survey starting with Montesquieu and culminating with Rawls.
Baron de Montesquieu
Baron de Montesquieu (1689 - 1755 CE) was a French political philosopher most
famous for his work, The Spirit of the Laws.   Montesquieu distinguishes between three2
 Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed., s.v. “Judgement.”1




different basic types of government.  These include a republic, a monarch, and a despotic
government.  A republic can be further divided depending on whether the people are
sovereign or whether a small group is sovereign.  He refers to these governments as a
democracy and an aristocracy respectively.  Montesquieu believes that while all citizens are
capable of exercising political judgement in order to select a representative, most citizens
would not be qualified to actually serve as a representative.  Virtue is the quality, for
Montesquieu, that is necessary for a republic to function.3
Montesquieu defines virtue as “love of the laws and of our country” and believes that
it is necessary for the education system to be focused primarily on virtue.   Montesquieu4
explains the importance of this:
A love of the republic in a democracy is a love of the democracy; as the latter
is that of equality. . . . Since every individual ought here to enjoy the same
happiness and the same advantages, they should consequently taste the same
pleasures and form the same hopes . . . The love of equality in a democracy
limits ambition to the sole desire, to the sole happiness, of doing greater
services to our country than the rest of our fellow-citizens.  They cannot all
render her equal services, but they all ought to serve her with equal alacrity. 
At our coming into the world, we contract an immense debt to our country,
which we can never discharge.  5
For Montesquieu, the important role of a citizen in a democracy is not to make every
individual political judgement, but to determine those individuals that are capable of making
 Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws, location 560, 574, 630, 921.3
 Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws, location 1201, 1340, 1548.4
 Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws, location 1562.5
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appropriate political judgements.   In addition, Montesquieu is especially concerned with6
protecting political liberty.
Montesquieu argues that political liberty only exists in governments that prevent
power from being abused.  He advocates separation of powers for this reason, dividing
governmental power into three categories.  These include legislative, executive, and judicial
powers.  In order to protect political liberty, it is necessary for different individuals or groups
of individuals to only have power over one particular power.  Montesquieu advocates for the
legislative power to be composed of elected citizens chosen from all parts of the country to
ensure that all interests are represented.  The executive power ought to be in the hands of one
person.  Montesquieu also advocates for a system of checks and balances arguing that each
of the three governmental powers ought to have some power over one another.  This further 
prevents power from being abused.   Political judgement, for Montesquieu, can only come7
about when power is not being abused.  While all have some level of political judgement, the
real power lies with the elected representative.  David Hume, the next philosopher, explicitly
argues that political judgement should rest with the upper class.     
David Hume
Hume (1711 - 1776 CE), an empiricist, was a key figure in the Scottish
Enlightenment.  In An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding,  Hume privileges8
experience over reason.  Dividing perceptions into two categories, ideas and impressions,
 Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws, location 3675.6
 Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws, location 4823 - 5062.7
 David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (1902) Kindle8
edition.
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Hume defines impressions as, “our more lively perceptions, when we hear, or see, or feel,
or love, or hate, or desire, or will.”   Later, Hume explains that ideas are simply imitations9
of impressions.  Hume also rejects the possibility of establishing cause and effect outside of
experience.  He explains, “No object ever discovers, by the qualities which appear to the
senses, either the causes which produced it, or the effects which will arise from it; nor can
our reason, unassisted by experience, ever draw any inference concerning real existence and
matter of fact.”   All humans have, according to Hume, is experience.10
Hume continues this argument, applying it to ethics in, A Treatise of Human Nature.  11
He argues that virtue and vice can not be determined by rational thought.  Ethics is nothing
more than impressions and is subsequently a feeling, not a judgement.  The feeling is that of
pleasure and pain.  Hume explains the origin of virtue and vice noting, “we must allow, that
the sense of justice and injustice is not derived from nature, but arises artificially, though
necessarily from education, and human conventions.”   Humans only behave in a certain12
way for the common interest of society since without justice humans would not be safe nor
be able to work together.  Hume explains justice as, “justice establishes itself by a kind of
convention or agreement; that is, by a sense of interest, supposed to be common to all, and
where every single act is performed in expectation that others are to perform the like.”  13
 Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, location 182 - 185.9
 Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, location 195, 289.10
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Hume’s views are in sharp contrast to many other Enlightenment thinkers since Hume rejects
the original state of nature.  
The original state of nature does not exist, according to Hume.  Hume argues that in
almost all cases, governments have not been established based on the consent of the people,
but rather out of conquest or revolt.  He continues by arguing that even in societies in which
the people did establish a government based on consent, it was not carried out in that fashion. 
For Hume, there are three variables that determine the strength of the government.  These
include “public interest, of right to power, and of right to property.”   Hume concludes that14
the commonwealth is the best form of government.  In his ideal, only those with a certain
amount of money are eligible to participate in the political process.  Hume notes:
The lower sort of people and small proprietors are good enough judges of one
not very distant from them in rank or habitation; and therefore, in their
parochial meetings, will probably choose the best, or nearly the best
representative: but they are wholly unfit for country meetings, and for
electing into the higher offices of the republic.  Their ignorance gives the
grandees an opportunity of deceiving them.15
Political judgement, for Hume, rests with the upper class who have the opportunity to elect
the upper offices of government and make significant decisions.  Jean-Jacques Rousseau, in
sharp contrast to many Enlightenment philosophers, attempts to question the notion of
society at a fundamental level.
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Jean-Jacques Rousseau
Rousseau (1712 - 1788 CE) was a Genevan philosopher who influenced  both the
American and French Revolutions.  In his popular work, The Social Contract, Rousseau
notes, “Man is born free, and everywhere he is in chains.  One believes himself the others’
master, and yet is more a slave than they.”   Rousseau believes that the creation of society16
was not necessarily advantageous to men with respect to virtue.  He explains that
contemporary society is only concerned with money and considers humans to be mere
objects.  He notes that this is a consequence of luxury and results from an education system
that dismisses virtue.  At base, Rousseau argues that the notion of citizen has disappeared in
the modern world.   Rousseau looks back to the original state of nature for answers.17
For Rousseau, men in the original state of nature were equal and were concerned only
with self-preservation.  Legitimacy could only be determined based on convention.
Comparing contemporary “Savage man” to humans in society, Rousseau notes that the
“Savage man” never complains about his life.  In addition, inequality does not exist in the
state of nature.  Rousseau describes the transition out of the state of nature as:
man, who had previously been free and independent, is now so to speak
subjugated by a multitude of new needs to the whole of Nature, and
especially to those of his kind, who slave in a sense becomes even by
 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, in The Social Contract and other later political16
writings, ed. Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 41.
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political writings, ed. Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 18, 20, 22,
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becoming their master; rich, he needs their services; poor, he needs their help,
and moderate means do not enable him to do without them.18
Inequality, for Rousseau, arose out of the creation of law, the creation of property, and the
establishment of masters and slaves.  Inequality, which did not exist in the state of nature,
becomes rampant in modern society.19
Eliminating inequality is the job of the government, according to Rousseau. 
Rousseau notes:
It is, therefore, one of the most important tasks of government to prevent
extreme inequality of fortunes, not by taking their treasures away from those
who possess them, but by depriving everyone of the means to accumulate
treasures, nor by building poorhouses, but by shielding citizens from
becoming poor.20
Legitimacy of government, for Rousseau, is determined by the primary interest of the
government.  If the government is concerned with the good of the people and follows the
general will, then the government is legitimate.  Rousseau describes this social compact as,
“Each of us puts his person and his full power in common under the supreme direction of the
general will; and in a body we receive each member as an indivisible part of the whole.”21
This necessarily implies that the citizens have some level of freedom and have been educated
with a sense of virtue.  He explains, “The fatherland cannot endure without freedom, nor
 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men, in 18
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freedom without virtue, nor virtue without citizens; you will have everything if you form
citizens; if you do not, you will have nothing but nasty slaves, beginning with the chiefs of
the state.”22
Man, under the social contract, gives up his natural freedom in order to have freedom
through society.  The general will is sovereign and the end of legislation ought to be freedom
and equality.  While Rousseau does not believe that one can determine what is the best form
of government, he does give some clues.  Using satire, Rousseau explains the characteristics
that would embody his ideal form of government.  The government would be a democracy
and be focused on the freedom of the citizens.  All citizens in the state would be equal under
the law and all would have the opportunity to participate in legislation.   Political23
judgement, for Rousseau, rests with the general will.  The next philosopher, Immanuel Kant,
takes one back to the metaphysical ideal forms of Plato.
Immanuel Kant
Kant (1724 - 1804 CE) was a German philosopher best known for his attempt to
reconcile the differences between rationalism and empiricism.  With respect to political
philosophy, Kant argued that justice is absent in the state of nature.  As a result, it is natural
for man to want to live in society.  Society denotes progress and the goal for society is to be
able to administer justice properly.  Kant explains, “The highest task which nature has set for
mankind must therefore be that of establishing a society in which freedom under external
 Rousseau, Discourse on Political Economy, 9, 15, 20.22
 Rousseau, The Social Contract, 54 - 55, 57, 78, 104 - 105; Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin and23
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laws  would be combined to the greatest possible extent with irresistible force, in other24
words of establishing a perfectly just civil constitution.”   It is only after the creation of this25
society that man can progress to his highest purpose, which for Kant is a “cosmopolitan
existence.”26
The Enlightenment, for Kant, denotes progress.  This progress can only occur if man
is free to utilize reason with respect to public issues.  Kant describes this public use of reason
as, “the use which anyone may make of it as a man of learning addressing the entire reading
public.”   Kant believes that it is critical and necessary for individuals to possess political27
judgement and address the public directly.  In order to do this, the citizenry must possess a
large amount of civil freedom.  
Kant believes that the government of an ideal state ought to be a commonwealth and
it is based on three a priori principles.  These principles include:
1.  The freedom of every member of society as a human being.
2.  The equality of each with all the others as a subject.
3.  The independence of each member of a commonwealth as a citizen.  28
Kant explains the role of the ruler as:
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So long as he sees to it that all true or imagined improvements are compatible
with the civil order, he can otherwise leave his subjects to do whatever they
find necessary for their salvation, which is none of his business.  But it is his
business to stop anyone forcibly hindering others from working as best they
can to define and promote their salvation.29
Citizens, according to Kant, include those that have the right to vote on legislation with the
qualification being a free adult male who owns property.  The end of this type of government
is “perpetual peace.”   Kant contrasts his ideal commonwealth with a democracy.  Kant30
believes that it is necessary to separate the legislative from the executive, since the people
cannot act as both the executive and the legislative simultaneously.  Kant believes that the
legislative power ought to be in the hands of the people.  The person who has executive
power is the ruler of the state and is also subject to the legislation enacted by the people.31
Political judgement, as a result, rests with the people with respect to legislation.  Kant
defines judgement as:
A judgment, therefore, is the mediate cognition of an object, consequently the
representation of a representation of it.  In every judgment there is a
conception which applies to, and is valid for, many other conceptions, and
which among these comprehends also a given representation, this last being
immediately connected with an object.32
These political judgements ought to be made according to the “universal law of right.”  Kant
describes this as, “Thus the universal law of right is as follows: let your external actions be
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such that the free application of your will can co-exist with the freedom of everyone in
accordance with a universal law.”   In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant describes how33
to act just specifically.  He explains, “Act so that the maxim of thy will can always at the
same time hold good as a principle of universal legislation.”34
An important concept for Kant is the idea.  He explains an idea as, “no object can
ever be presented that would be perfectly adequate to a transcendental idea.  . . . because the
idea, as the conception of a maximum, can never be completely and adequately presented in
concreto.”   In addition to the idea, Kant discusses the ideal.  Similar to Plato's ideal forms,35
a Kantian ideal would be the perfection of an idea.  Kant explains:
As the idea provides a rule, so the ideal serves as an archetype for the perfect
and complete determination of the copy.  Thus the conduct of the wise and
divine man serves us a standard of action, with which we may compare and
judge ourselves, which may help us to reform ourselves, although the
perfection it demands can never be attained by us.  Although we cannot
concede objective reality to these ideals, they are not to be considered as
chimeras; on the contrary, they provide reason with a standard, which enables
it to estimate, by comparison, the degree of incompleteness in the objects
presented to it.36
For Kant, ideas can be used in a “regulative” sense in the hopes of “approximating” the
ideal.   As a result, political judgement for Kant rests with the individual using regulative 37
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judgement based on the idea of freedom discussed above.  This survey continues with Georg
Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, a German philosopher influenced by Kant.
Georg W. F. Hegel
Hegel (1770 - 1831 CE)  was a prominent German idealist whose most well known38
work of political philosophy was the Philosophy of Right.   Unlike most previous political39
philosophers, Hegel is less concerned with advocating a particular ideal version of the state,
but rather to show that the state is a “rational entity.”   He explains:40
To comprehend what is  is the task of philosophy, for what is is reason.  As41
far as the individual is concerned, each individual is in any case a child of his
time; thus philosophy, too, is its own time comprehended in thoughts.  It is
just as foolish to imagine that any philosophy can transcend its contemporary
world as that an individual can overleap his own time or leap over Rhodes. 
If his theory does indeed transcend his own time, if it builds itself a world as
it ought to be, then it certainly has an existence, but only within his opinions
– a pliant medium in which the imagination can construct anything it pleases. 
. . . What lies between reason as self-conscious spirit and reason as present
actuality, what separates the former from the latter and prevents it from
finding satisfaction in it, is the fetter of some abstraction or other which has
not been liberated into [the form of] the concept.  To recognize reason as the
rose in the cross of the present and thereby to delight in the present – this
rational insight is the reconciliation with actuality which philosophy grants
to those who have received the inner call to comprehend, to preserve their
subjective freedom in the realm of the substantial, and at the same time to
 Within the academic community there exists a debate over Hegel’s political philosophy.  Some38
scholars privilege his metaphysical writings while others look towards his more practical pieces.  This enquiry
is concerned more specifically with political judgement and as a result will not engage in this controversy.  For
more information see the general introduction in, G. W. F. Hegel, Political Writings, ed. Laurence Dickey and
H.B. Nisbet, trans. H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1999), Kindle edition.
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(Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, 21.40
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stand with their subjective freedom not in a particular and contingent
situation, but in what has being in and for itself.42
The only requirement concerning the creation of a state, for Hegel, is that “it should form a
common military force and political authority.”43
The importance of the state, with respect to the individual, in Hegel’s thought is
evident by his quote of a Pythagorean man addressing his son explaining, “Make him the
citizen of a state with good laws.”   As such, Hegel believes that government and man must44
be consistent.  He comments, “How blind are those who like to believe that institutions,
constitutions, and laws which no longer accord with men’s customs, needs, and opinions, and
from which the spirit has departed, can continue to exist, or that forms in which feeling and
understanding no longer have an interest are enough to furnish a lasting bond for a nation.”45
For Hegel, history involves the progression of the Idea of freedom.  He argues that
the role of the state is to uphold this natural right of freedom and that the role of the
government is to administer the laws and look after the state.  There exists an
interconnectedness between the individual and society.  Hegel explains:
The selfish end in its actualization, conditioned in this way by universality,
establishes a system of all-round interdependence, so that the subsistence
[Subsistenz] and welfare of the individual [des Einzelnen] and his rightful
existence [Dasein] are interwoven with, and grounded on, the subsistence,
 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, 21 - 22.42
 G. W. F. Hegel, The German Constitution, in Political Writings, ed. Laurence Dickey and H.B.43
Nisbet, trans. H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1999), Kindle edition, 16.
 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, 196.44
 G. W. F. Hegel, The Magistrates should be Elected by the People, in Political Writings, ed.45
Laurence Dickey and H.B. Nisbet, trans. H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1999),
Kindle edition, 2.
80
welfare, and rights of all, and have actuality and security only in this
context.46
The individual is only able to conduct an ethical life by being part of the state.  This is not
to say that Hegel necessarily supports a democracy.  Hegel notes:
The idea [Vorstellung] that all individuals ought to participate in
deliberations and decisions on the universal concerns of the state – on the
grounds that they are all members of the state and that the concerns of the
state are the concerns of everyone, so that everyone has a right to share in
them with his own knowledge and volition – seeks to implant in the organism
of the state a democratic element devoid of rational form, although it is only
by virtue of its rational form that the state is an organism.47
Hegel continues by arguing that it is through public opinion that individuals in society can
exercise and express opinions.  Political judgement cannot rest directly with the citizens
according to Hegel.  He argues that this is due to the large populations of modern states
making it infeasible to have all citizens make the decisions.   The next political philosopher48
is John Stuart Mill.
John Stuart Mill
The utilitarian principles of Mill (1806 - 1873 CE)  were first echoed by Jeremy49
Bentham (1748 - 1832 CE).  As a result, this section first looks to the ideas of Bentham and
then moves on to Mill.  Bentham, the founder of utilitarianism, established the principle of
utility to determine appropriate moral action.  Bentham explains:
 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, 221; G. W. F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of History, in Political46
Writings, ed. Laurence Dickey and H.B. Nisbet, trans. H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University
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81
By the principle of utility is meant that principle which approves or
disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it
appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose
interest is in question: or, what is the same thing in other words, to promote
or to oppose that happiness.  I say of every action whatsoever; and therefore
not only of every action of a private individual, but of every measure of
government.50
The role of the individual is to promote pleasure and minimize pain.  The role of the
government, more specifically, is to maximize the happiness of society and minimize bad
behavior.  Bentham argues that there are four sources or sanctions of pleasure and pain. 
These sanctions include the physical, political, moral, and religious.  Bentham also
establishes seven criteria to consider when making decisions using the utility principle to
measure pleasure and pain.  The criteria include intensity, duration, certainty or uncertainty,
nearness or remoteness, magnitude, purity, and extent.   Mill would expound upon the51
utilitarian principles established by Bentham.
Mill believes in the notion of Philosophical Necessity.  Philosophical Necessity holds
that the action of an individual, like that of a physical event, could be determined if one
understood the complete nature of the individual.  Mill does not take this to mean that
individual actions are predetermined, only that this means unless the person alters himself
in some fashion or is influenced in a certain manner, the action will occur.  This ability to
alter oneself, Mill calls moral freedom.    52
 Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, in Utilitarianism and50
Other Essays, ed. Alan Ryan (London, England: Penguin Books, 2004), 65 - 66.
 Bentham, Principles of Morals and Legislation, 83 - 84, 86 - 89, 97.51
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Moral freedom, or ethics for Mill, is an art not a science.  The act of legislation is in
the same realm.  The legislator is not constrained completely to rules like a judge, but rather
is able to incorporate other modes of thought.  Mill explains:
By a wise practitioner, therefore, rules of conduct will only be considered as
provisional.  Being made for the most numerous cases, or for those of most
ordinary occurrence, they point out the manner in which it will be least
perilous to act, where time or means do not exist for analysing the actual
circumstances of the case, or where we cannot trust our judgement in
estimating them.   53
Legislation deals with ought not is.  Mill, following Bentham, looks to happiness as the
ethical critieria.54
The focus of Mill’s Utilitarianism  is to establish a criteria to answer ethical55
questions.  Mill explains his criteria as:
The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest
Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to
promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. 
By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness,
pain, and the privation of pleasure.56
Mill argues that it is not the individual happiness that is the criteria, but the happiness of
everyone that is in question.  Utility is the standard of morality for Mill.  To establish this in
a practical sense, Mill believes that the education system would need to be reformed to
ingrain in the character of children that a link exists between individual happiness and the
 Mill, A System of Logic, 121 - 122, 124.53
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happiness of the whole.  As a result, political judgement rests with the individual making an
impartial decision with respect to the Utility principle.   The next philosopher, Karl Marx,57
was influenced in many respects by Hegel.
Karl Marx
Marx (1818 - 1883 CE) was a German philosopher who argued that class struggle
represents the history of society.  Specifically, in a capitalistic society, the class struggle
occurs between the Bourgeoisie and the Proletariat.  The Bourgeoisie represents the
dominant social class and control the economic means of production.  Governmental
decisions are made based on their influence, according to Marx.  The Proletariat represents
the working class who lack both control over the means of production and political power. 
Marx believes that the Proletariat are being exploited by the Bourgeoisie, turned into a
commodity, and that everything in society is based on exchange.58
Marx denotes the purpose of the Communist Party as to unite the Proletarian,
overthrow the Bourgeoisie, and take political power.  Marx explains, “In bourgeois society,
living labour is but a means to increase accumulated labour.  In Communist society,
accumulated labour is but a means to widen, to enrich, to promote the existence of the
labourer.”   The end goal of communism is the elimination of private property.   In The59
German Ideology, Marx describes communism as:
 Mill, Utilitariansim , 282 - 283, 288 - 289, 299, 301.57
 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto, (Oxford, England: Oxford University58
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Communism differs from all previous movements in that it overturns the
basis of all earlier relations of production and intercourse, and for the first
time consciously treats all naturally evolved premises as the creations of
hitherto existing men, strips them of their natural character and subjugates
them to the power of the united individuals.  Its organisation is, therefore,
essentially economic, the material production of the conditions of this unity. 
The reality which communism creates is precisely the true basis for rendering
it impossible that anything should exist independently of individuals, insofar
as reality is nevertheless only a product of the preceding intercourse of
individuals.  Thus the communists in practice treat the conditions created up
to now by production and intercourse as inorganic conditions, without,
however, imagining that it was the plan or the destiny of previous generations
to give them material, and without believing that these conditions were
inorganic for the individual creating them.60
Political judgement, for Marx, is best summarized by the communist slogan, “From each
according to his abilities, to each according to his needs!”   Friedrich Nietzsche, the next61
philosopher, would begin to shake the foundations of Western philosophy.
Friedrich Nietzsche
Nietzsche (1844 - 1900 CE) was a German philosopher who eloquently expressed his
criticism of modern culture.  Humans in the original state of nature, for Nietzsche, could be
compared to barbarians.  The strong overtook the weak.  Rejecting the notion that humans
created society for mutual benefit, Nietzsche notes that it is the “exploitive” nature of man
that is at the heart of humanity.  Nietzsche explains, “life is essentially  appropriation,62
 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology, (New York, NY: Prometheus Books, 1998),60
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injury, overpowering, of what is alien and weaker; suppression, hardness, imposition of one’s
own forms, incorporation and at least, at its mildest, exploitation.”63
Nietzsche questions the rational foundation most philosophers have applied to
morality.  Instead, he denotes two types of morality that overlap in the individual.  These
include “master morality” and “slave morality.”  Master morality signifies the class with
power determining what is moral.  Nietzsche explains, “The noble type of man experiences
itself as determining values; it does not need approval; it judges . . . it knows itself to be that
which first accords honor to things; it is value-creating.  Everything it knows as part of itself
it honors: such a morality is self-glorification.”   Slave morality, on the other hand, is64
signified by, “a pessimistic suspicion about the whole condition of man . . . he is skeptical
and suspicious . . . slave morality is essentially a morality of utility.”   65
Nietzsche also differentiates between what he calls the historical and unhistorical. 
He argues the importance of both for the individual and society as a whole.  Modern man,
for Nietzsche, puts too much emphasis on the historical.  Nietzsche explains:
For we moderns have nothing of our own.  We only become worth notice by
filling ourselves to overflowing with foreign customs, arts, philosophies,
religions and sciences; we are wandering encyclopaedias, as an ancient Greek
who had strayed into our time would probably call us.  But the only value of
an encyclopaedia lies in the inside, in the contents, not in what is written
 Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, in Basic Writings of Nietzsche, trans. Walter Kaufmann,63
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outside, in the binding or the wrapper.  And so the whole of modern culture
is essentially internal.   66
Nietzsche believes that the modern man ignores what is actually in front of him in order to 
compare, analyze, and summarize.  This has significant implications with respect to
judgement.67
Nietzsche notes that judgement is not something that can be willed.  He explains that
only a few have the ability to be just.  Nietzsche explains that the origin of justice is based
on self-preservation and amounted to a trade between individuals.  It was completely
egoistic.  He also notes that justice has nothing to do with objectivity.  Nietzsche says, “But
there are no means of planting a power of judgment; and so when one speaks to men of truth
and justice, they will be ever troubled by the doubt whether it be the fanatic or the judge who
is speaking to them.”   Nietzsche believes that it is not proper for the current generation to68
judge the past, reserving this power for a select few.  Connecting judgement to the modern
emphasis on the historical, Nietzsche explains:
If there be no constructive impulse behind the historical one, if the clearance
of rubbish be not merely to leave the ground free for the hopeful living future
to build its house, if justice alone be supreme, the creative instinct is sapped
and discouraged.  A religion, for example, that has to be turned into a matter
of historical knowledge by the power of pure justice, and to be scientifically
studied throughout, is destroyed at the end of it all.  For the historical audit
brings so much to light which is false and absurd, violent and inhuman, that
the condition of pious illusion falls to pieces.   69
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There are no hard and fast rules with respect to political judgement for Nietzsche.  In this
respect, Lyotard is consistent with Nietzsche.  Martin Heidegger, the controversial German
philosopher who challenged the prevailing notion of truth, will be discussed next.
Martin Heidegger
Heidegger (1889 - 1976 CE) was a German philosopher who had a significant
influence on the development of phenomenology, existentialism, and post-structuralism.  He
is predominantly interested in the neglected notion of Being, and in general did not deal with
political judgement directly.  Heidegger believes that Western philosophy, after the Greeks,
has abandoned the question of what constitutes being.  Heidegger rejects previous attempts
to understand the nature of Being through some type of metaphysical concept such as Plato’s
ideal forms or the notion of a God.  Instead, he proposes to attempt to understand Being
through a specific example he refers to as Dasein which can be roughly translated as
existence.70
Analyzing Dasein allows Heidegger to analyze Being.  He explains that this analysis,
“only brings out the Being of this being, without interpreting its meaning.  Its aim is rather
to expose the horizon for the most original interpretation of Being.  Once we have reached
that horizon the preparatory analysis of Dasein requires recovery on a higher, properly
ontological basis.”   Central to this analysis is the notion of time.  Rejecting all previous71
analysis from the Greeks to the present, Heidegger describes his task as:
 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time: Introduction, in Basic Writings, ed. David Farrell Krell,70
(London, England: HarperCollins, 2008), 41 - 49, 54.
 Heidegger, Being and Time, 60.71
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If the question of Being is to achieve clarity regarding its own history, a
loosening of the sclerotic tradition and a dissolving of the concealments
produced by it are necessary.  We understand this task as the destructuring72
of the traditional content of ancient ontology, which is to be carried out along
the guidelines of the question of Being.  This destructuring is based on the
original experiences in which the first and subsequently guiding
determinations of Being were gained.73
 Heidegger, following Husserl, refers to his type of analysis as phenomenology.   74
Heidegger uses the notion of anxiety as an attempt to understand Dasein.  Heidegger
explains, “Holding itself out into the nothing, Dasein is in each case already beyond beings
as a whole.  This being beyond beings we call ‘transcendence.’  If in the ground of its essence
Dasein were not transcending, which now means, if it were not in advance holding itself out
into the nothing, then it could never be related to being nor even to itself.”   As a result,75
Dasein is a question of metaphysics.76
Truth, for Heidegger, is based on the notion of freedom.  Heidegger explains:
Freedom, understood as letting beings be, is the fulfillment and
consummation of the essence of truth in the sense of the disclosure of beings.
‘Truth’ is not a feature of correct propositions that are asserted of an ‘object’
by a human ‘subject’ and then ‘are valid’ somewhere, in what sphere we
know not; rather, truth is disclosure of beings through which an openness
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essentially unfolds [west].  All human comportment and bearing are exposed
in its open region.77
Philosophy, for Heidegger, should not be compared to the sciences and it is not based on
logic.  He also dismisses humanism believing that to dismiss logic allows one to engage in
reflective thinking.  Heidegger, responding to critics explains, “To think against values
therefore does not mean to beat the drum for the valuelessness and nullity of beings.  It
means rather to bring the clearing of the truth of Being before thinking, as against
subjectivizing beings into mere objects.”   While Heidegger does not directly discuss78
political judgement, his challenge to the prevailing notion of truth is important on the
trajectory of political philosophy.  John Rawls, the next philosopher, offers a much more
contemporary version of political judgement.    
John Rawls
Rawls (1921 - 2002 CE) was an American political philosopher most known for his
A Theory of Justice.   Composed as an alternative to utilitarianism and intuitionism, Rawls79
crafts a political philosophy following Kant.   Rawls believes that justice is the cornerstone80
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of institutions and as a result, he supports traditional notions of individual democratic liberty. 
In particular, Rawls is concerned with social justice and how rights are distributed in society
through institutions.  He accepts social contract theory as an appropriate hypothetical
scenario to establish justice.  At base, Rawls privileges “rational choice” theory believing
that it is in an individuals best interest to accept notions of justice.  Rawls illustrates is
conception of justice for institutions as follows:
FIRST PRINCIPLE
Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of
equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.
SECOND PRINCIPLE
Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both:
(a)  to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the
just savings principle, and
(b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of
fair equality of opportunity.
FIRST PRIORITY RULE (THE PRIORITY OF LIBERTY)
The principles of justice are to be ranked in lexical order and therefore the
basic liberties can be restricted only for the sake of liberty.  There are two
cases:
(a) a less extensive liberty must strengthen the total system of liberties
shared by all;
(b) a less than equal liberty must be acceptable to those with the
lesser liberty.
SECOND PRIORITY RULE (THE PRIORITY OF JUSTICE OVER
EFFICIENCY AND WELFARE)
The second principle of justice is lexically prior to the principle of efficiency
and to that of maximizing the sum of advantages; and fair opportunity is prior
to the difference principle.  There are two cases:
edition, location 95.
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(a) an inequality of opportunity must enhance the opportunities of
those with the lesser opportunity;
(b) an excessive rate of saving must on balance mitigate the burden
of those bearing this hardship.81
It is through the political process that citizens have the obligation to ensure that justice is the
foundation of the institutions.
For Rawls, justice is consistent with the prevailing notions of basic liberties that are
established in most constitutional democracies.  These basic liberties include freedom of
thought, freedom of speech, the right to own property, and the right to vote, among others. 
It is important to note that Rawls rejects the notion that justice consists of a priori principles. 
Whether something is considered just or unjust it not a preconceived notion, rather political
judgement rests with the individual.  The expression of this political judgement is done in
the voting booth.82
Summary
This chapter, the second of a two-chapter survey of the history of political judgement,
began with Montesquieu and culminated with Rawls.  Chapter 3 began with Protagoras and
ended with Locke.  Montesquieu believes that political judgement ought to rest with elected
representatives.  Hume, on the other hand, supports the elite possessing political judgement. 
Rousseau introduces the concept of general will with respect to political judgement.  Kant
argues that political judgement rests with individuals using regulative judgement based on
his idea of freedom.  Hegel does not recognize political judgement in the hands of ordinary
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citizens.  Mill believes that it rests with individual citizens utilizing the Utility principle. 
Marx, revolutionarily, supports the abolition of private property and a communist society. 
Nietzsche is critical of everything and Heidegger challenges the prevailing notion of truth. 
Lastly, Rawls advocates a liberal notion of political judgement resting with the individual
in the voting booth. 
Chapter 5
Standardized Testing and Freedom of Thought:
A Lyotardian Examination
Reality is not a matter of the absolute eyewitness, but a matter of the future.1
-Jean-François Lyotard
Introduction
The purpose of this Critical Enquiry is to examine whether the practice of
government mandated standardized achievement tests of knowledge in American public
schools is consistent with the type of education necessary for citizens to exercise their right
to freedom of thought in order to make informed political judgements.  Beginning with a
description of standardized testing and a review of the notion of freedom of thought, this
chapter is an examination of the implications of standardized testing on freedom of thought
through a Lyotardian lens.  Since the analysis depends on an adequate understanding of
Lyotard, Lyotard’s philosophy will be integrated throughout the analysis.




As discussed in Chapter 1, the practice of standardized testing has been embedded
in federal legislation since 1965 after passage of the Elementary and Secondary Education
Act.  Current education policy, Race to the Top, mandates the use of standardized testing in
order for states to compete for federal funds.  Richard P. Phelps, a supporter of standardized
testing, considers a test to be standardized, “if any aspect of a test–format, procedures, or
administration–is uniform across test takers.”   Phelps failed to recognize the fundamental2
aspect of standardized testing, for a test to be “standardized” the knowledge tested must be
assumed to be “true”—universally accepted as being outside the bounds of knowledge.  The
two basic types of standardized tests are achievement tests, the focus of this study, and
aptitude tests.  Unlike an aptitude test which is used in order to predict future success of
some type, achievement tests are constructed to determine what has been previously learned. 
It must be noted that a strong correlation exists between standardized aptitude tests and
standardized achievement tests. Standardized achievement tests, unlike teacher created
classroom assessments, are designed to be a broad measure of student learning based on
some type of ideal standard established outside of the classroom.  Scoring can be interpreted
from three different perspectives that include criterion-referenced, norm-referenced, or
standards-based.   It is necessary to consider the roots of standardized testing.3
 Richard P. Phelps, Standardized Testing Primer (New York, NY: Peter Lange Publishing, 2007),2
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While the notion of standardization is ancient, the roots of standardization in the
United States in the field of education can be traced to the United States Military Academy
at Westpoint in the early 1800s.  Sylvanus Thayer, Superintendent of West Point (1817 -
1833 CE), introduced a standardized grading system to assess student examinations.  Thayer
designed these to “objectively” measure and compare individual students.   Standardization4
was popularized in the field of public education during what Raymond E. Callahan described
as the scientific management movement which gained popularity in the early part of the
twentieth century.  Callahan noted that Frederick Winslow Taylor, the founder of scientific
management, believed that it was possible to establish scientifically objective standards
which would lead to improvements in efficiency.5
Scientific management was popularized in the field of education by Franklin Bobbitt,
an education administration instructor at the University of Chicago, in the early 1900s. 
Bobbitt believed that one could view the education of children like the creation of a product
in a factory.  As a result, he advocated the use of both standardization and scales of
measurement in public schools.  Callahan, discussing Bobbitt, explained:
With this system neither students, teachers, nor principals could offer lame
excuses for inferior performance, for with everything so definitely recorded
there would be no place to hide and responsibility could be fixed.
Furthermore, this would be done (as Taylor claimed it would be done in the
machine shop) without anyone feeling that he had been treated unfairly
because all of this would not be done arbitrarily but scientifically.6
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Also in the early 1900s, the Carnegie unit, based on the notions of standardization and
efficiency, was having a significant effect on the structure of schooling.  The Carnegie unit,
established by the Carnegie Foundation, but originally developed by the Committee of Ten
and the Committee on College Entrance Requirements, represented the standardization of
time and credit for courses.  Setting the standard for admission into college, the Carnegie unit
was eventually utilized by public schools throughout the country since it was required by 
accreditation bodies and enacted into legislation in many states.  As a result, the traditional
school day developed with a day divided into periods of equal length and time.   The rise of7
scientific management coupled with the universal adoption of the Carnegie unit provided a
stable foundation for the utilization of standardized testing in American public schools. 
Before looking at the implications of standardized testing on freedom of thought, it is
necessary to review the notion of freedom of thought. 
Freedom of Thought
As discussed in Chapter 1, successful governance in a democracy requires citizens
who possess the ability and resources to make informed political judgements which requires
freedom of thought.  It was recognized in this enquiry, as discussed in Chapter 2, that
freedom of thought is fundamental to freedom of speech.  Both are protected by the First
Amendment.  While the road towards recognition of freedom of thought has been tortuous,
the United States Supreme Court has settled on the Brandenburg test in order to determine
whether speech/thought is constitutional.  In order for the government to suppress
 David Tyack and Larry Cuban, Tinkering Toward Utopia: A Century of Public School Reform7
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), 91 - 93.
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speech/thought, under Brandenburg, it is not enough that the speech incites criminal activity,
the speech must also be likely to produce the said action.  The Brandenburg test will be
applied to standardized testing and freedom of thought following the Lyotardian
examination.  
Lyotardian Examination
This section is a deconstruction of the practice of standardized achievement testing
through the work of Lyotard.  Each facet of Lyotard’s thought begins with philosophical
foundations followed by practical implications.   Of particular importance for this8
deconstruction is Lyotard’s The Postmodern Condition and The Differend.  The Postmodern
Condition, Lyotard’s most famous text, is a report concerned with the current state of
knowledge in “highly developed societies.”   This report was prepared for the Conseil des9
Universitiés of the government of Quebec.  In the report, Lyotard describes highly developed
societies as postmodern which he defines as “incredulity toward metanarratives.”   In10
contrast, modern is used by Lyotard, “to designate any science that legitimates itself with
reference to a metadiscourse of this kind making an explicit appeal to some grand narrative,
such as the dialectics of Spirit, the hermeneutics of meaning, the emancipation of the rational
or working subject, or the creation of wealth.”   The Differend is organized as a series of11
short philosophical arguments interrupted, at times, by highly technical notices pertaining
 The use of practical in practical implications is not to be confused with an Aristotelean sense of8
practical concerned with political knowledge.
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to a variety of philosophers.  Both are instructive to examine standardized testing and
freedom of thought.
Knowledge
Since Protagoras, philosophers have discussed the epistemological foundations of
knowledge.  Lyotard begins The Postmodern Condition by describing the state of knowledge
in the postmodern age.   
Philosophical Foundations
Lyotard argues that the state of knowledge in a particular society changes when it
enters the postindustrial age and cultures enter the postmodern age.  One feature of the
postmodern age is the radical change that has taken place within the discourse of science
with respect to technology.  Lyotard argues that the changes in technology are bound to have
an effect on research and teaching, the two major functions of knowledge.  He believes that
future research will be determined based on what can be translated into computers and that
teaching is being altered based on the new mediums through which knowledge is made
available.  Lyotard further explains, “Knowledge is and will be produced in order to be sold,
it is and will be consumed in order to be valorized in a new production: in both cases, the
goal is exchange.  Knowledge ceases to be an end in itself, it loses its ‘use-value.’”  For12
Lyotard, this has a significant effect on learning.  No longer will one learn for educational
reasons or to be enlightened, one will learn in order to make money (payment knowledge)
or to increase the opportunity for future payment (investment knowledge).13
 Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, 1-3.12
 Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, 6.13
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In the society described above, after the transformation of knowledge, scientific
discourse becomes dominant.  The problem, Lyotard argues, is that there is a difference
between knowledge and science. He argues that knowledge is a broad category that
encompasses much more than the denotative statements that make up scientific knowledge. 
For Lyotard, scientific knowledge is simply a subset of a much larger category of knowledge
composed of a variety of discourse.  Lyotard describes knowledge:
But what is meant by the term knowledge is not only a set of denotative
statements, far from it.  It also includes notions of “know-how,” “knowing
how to live,” “how to listen” [savoir-faire, savoir-vivre, savoir-écouter], etc.
Knowledge, then, is a question of competence that goes beyond the simple
determination and application of the criterion of truth, extending to the
determination and application of criteria of efficiency (technical
qualification), of justice and/or happiness (ethical wisdom), of the beauty of
a sound or color (auditory and visual sensibility), etc.  Understood in this
way, knowledge is what makes someone capable of forming “good”
denotative utterances.  . . . It is not a competence relative to a particular class
of statements (for example, cognitive ones) to the exclusion of all others.  On
the contrary, it makes “good” performances in relation to a variety of objects
of discourse possible: objects to be known, decided on, evaluated,
transformed.  . . . From this derives one of the principal features of
knowledge: it coincides with an extensive array of competence-building
measures and is the only form embodied in a subject constituted by the
various areas of competence composing it.  14
In sum, for Lyotard, knowledge is an expansive category that includes not just scientific
knowledge, but also a wide-variety of other discourses.
Practical Implications
Standardized testing has implications on freedom of thought when analyzed through
Lyotard’s notion of the changing state of knowledge.  Standardized testing, consistent with
scientific knowledge, is limited to statements that can be declared either true or false.  As a
 Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, 18-19.14
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result, students are required to select the one “true” answer and are unable to alter the
selections.  If schools focus on preparing students for the standardized test, then the
curriculum becomes altered.  Knowledge is dramatically effected since the curriculum is no
longer concerned with student enlightenment nor pedagogy, but rather focused on payment
and investment knowledge.  What counts as knowledge on the standardized test becomes the
focus of teaching along with preparation for the workplace.  Learning, as a result, revolves
around the denotative statements that make up scientific knowledge.  In order for students
to exercise their right to freedom of thought, students need to learn much more than just the
cognitive knowledge emphasized on the standardized test.  Freedom of thought requires as
broad a spectrum of various types of knowledge as possible including, but not limited to, all
aspects of knowledge described above by Lyotard.
Language Games
Lyotard analyzes knowledge, in the postmodern society, through his notion of
language games.  The notion of language games was originally conceptualized through the
work of Ludwig Wittgenstein.  15
Philosophical Foundations
Language games, for Lyotard, are made up of three elements—the sender, addressee,
and referent.  The sender is the person who utters a statement, the addressee is the person
 Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889 - 1951 CE)  was an influential twentieth century British philosopher who15
first  developed the notion of language games.  Wittgenstein believed that language was made up of smaller
structures he called language games.  The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 2nd ed., s.v. “Ludwig
Wittgenstein.” 
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who receives a statement, and the referent is what the statement is about.  Lyotard makes
several observations about language games.  He notes:
The first is that their rules do not carry within themselves their own
legitimation, but are the object of a contract, explicit or not, between players
(which is not to say that the players invent the rules).  The second is that if
there are no rules, there is no game, that even an infinitesimal modification
of one rule alters the nature of the game, that a “move” or utterance that does
not satisfy the rules does not belong to the game they define.  The third
remark is suggested by what has just been said: every utterance should be
thought of as a “move” in a game.16
After this analysis, Lyotard discusses three different language games in the text—the
denotative, technical, and prescriptive.  Each game is incompatible with the others and has
its own criteria of distinction.
In the denotative game, the criteria of distinction is true/false.  The sender has the
“knowledge” about the referent and it is up to the addressee to agree or disagree.  Science is
an example of a denotative language game.  In the technical game, the criteria of distinction
is efficient/inefficient.  In this game, the sender has authority to make the statement and,
unlike the denotative game, the addressee does not have a say in the matter.  This language
game might involve manufacturing.  In the prescriptive game, the criteria of distinction is
just/unjust.  The sender occupies a position of authority and expects the addressee to comply
with the prescription.  This language game might include commands or orders.  For Lyotard,
language games become extremely important since “the observable social bond is composed
of language ‘moves.’”17
 Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, 9-10.16
 Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, 9-11, 46.17
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The postmodern social bond, for Lyotard, is language games which are “the minimum
relation for society to exist.”   Messages have different forms and effects depending on their18
type.  The addressee, after receiving a message, undergoes displacement, “an alteration of
some kind that not only affects him in his capacity as addressee and referent, but also the
sender.”   This provokes a countermove, which many times are not “good” since they are19
reactionary.  Lyotard notes the importance of displacements since they might lead to an
unexpected move.  Humans engaged in conversation use a variety of language games, but
institutions, many times, “privilege certain classes of statements.”   This is usually based on20
rules, but these rules are not necessarily written down.
Statements are “judged to be ‘good’ because they conform to the relevant criteria (of
justice, beauty, truth, and efficiency respectively) accepted in the social circle of the
‘knower’s’ [sic] interlocutors.”   These are opinions and this consensus is based on21
narratives.  Narrative knowledge does a variety of things.  For Lyotard, first, “narratives
allow the society in which they are told . . . to define its criteria of competence and . . . to
evaluate according to those criteria what is performed within it.”   Second, multiple22
language games can be conducted in narratives.  Third, the rules that the social bond are
based on are transmitted though narratives.  Finally, narratives legitimate themselves. 
 Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, 15.18
 Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, 16.19
 Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, 16-17.20
 Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, 19.21
 Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, 19-20.22
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Lyotard summarizes, “They [narratives] thus define what has the right to be said and done
in the culture in question, and since they are themselves a part of that culture, they are
legitimated by the simple fact that they do what they do.”23
Lyotard argues, on the other hand, that scientific knowledge is drastically different. 
There are two conditions that scientific statements must meet.  One, they must be available
for repeated observations (replication) and two, the scientific community must give the
statement their consensus.  Since consensus is required, the research game under science is
dialectical.  The teaching game, within science, on the contrary, is didactic.  The teacher, or
sender, knows more than the student, or addressee.  The goal of the teacher is for the student
to become the expert and eventually participate in the dialectical research game.24
Through descriptions of narrative and scientific knowledge Lyotard contrasts their
essence.  Scientific knowledge is based on the denotative language game where the criteria
of distinction is true/false.  This is different from narrative knowledge which allows for a
wide variety of language games, which make up the social bond.  In scientific research, only
the sender needs to be competent and a scientific statement is always subject to falsification. 
Finally, scientific knowledge requires that the sender be familiar with previous research in
the field.  Lyotard states:
Both are composed of sets of statements; the statements are “moves” made
by the players within the framework of generally applicable rules; these rules
are specific to each particular kind of knowledge, and the “moves” judged to
be “good” in one cannot be of the same type as those judged “good” in
another, unless it happens that way by chance.  It is therefore impossible to
 Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, 20-23.23
 Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, 18, 24-25.24
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judge the existence or validity of narrative knowledge on the basis of
scientific knowledge and vice versa: the relevant criteria are different.25
In short, scientific knowledge can not be used to justify narrative knowledge.  The same is
true in the opposite direction.
Practical Implications
It is instructive to examine standardized testing within the context of Lyotard’s
language games.  Standardized testing is conducted exclusively in the denotative language
game since the criteria of distinction is limited to true/false.  With respect to the three
elements of language games (sender, addressee, and referent), standardized testing eliminates
the role of the addressee.  The student is left out of the process of determining the reality of
the referent through consensus and lacks the ability to subject the “true” answer to
falsification.  The correct answer has already been established by the government.  The
institution of public education, through standardized testing, privileges the denotative
language game to the exclusion of all others.  Narrative knowledge is lost since it cannot be
reduced to the true/false criteria of distinction.  In order for citizens to exercise freedom of
thought, narrative knowledge is essential, because citizens, in addition to determining truth,
must contemplate issues relating to justice, efficiency, happiness, beauty, amongst others.
Legitimation Through Performativity    
Lyotard continues his analysis by arguing that through “performativity,” the scientific
denotative language game has been coopted by the technical language game.  To do this,
Lyotard illustrates how the research practice is altered in postmodern societies.  These
 Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, 25-26.25
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changes include “a multiplication in methods of argumentation and a rising complexity level
in the process of establishing proof.”   Both have implications for science and are discussed26
in order.  
Philosophical Foundations
First, Lyotard shows that in order for a scientific statement to be accepted, its
“axiomatics,” the assumptions of the researcher, must first be accepted.  As a result,
scientific knowledge is made up of a variety of language games based on its axiomatics and
“moves” depend on the players accepting the rules of the game (axiomatics).  Lyotard notes
that there are two different types of “progress” in knowledge.  These include the invention
of a “new move (a new argument) within the established rules” and the invention of “new
rules, in other words, a change to a new game.”   27
Second, Lyotard shows that scientific observation has been greatly enhanced though
the use of technology which, in order to establish proof, has become a necessity.  28
Technology is expensive resulting in those with money having a greater probability of
verifying their scientific statements and determining what counts as truth.  As a result,
Lyotard argues, “science becomes a force of production.”   The  language game of science29
 Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, 41.26
 Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, 42-43.27
 Recall, technology requires the performativity or efficiency game where the criteria of distinction28
is efficient/inefficient unlike science which requires the denotative game where the criteria of distinction is
true/false.
 Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, 44-45.29
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is no longer the denotative game, but is now controlled by performativity.  Research, and
subsequently science, in the postmodern society is legitimated through performativity.30
Lyotard also shows how performativity dominates teaching in a postmodern society
through a discussion of education.  If one assumes that an established body of knowledge
exists in a society, then it is necessary to determine how it should be diffused through
education.  Knowledge is diffused through education based on the answers to the following
questions: “Who transmits learning?  What is transmitted?  To whom?  Through what
medium?  In what form?  With what effect?”   Since research is controlled by the31
performative game instead of the denotative game, it follows that the answer to those
questions will be different in a postmodern society.  Lyotard explains this change, “The
transmission of knowledge is no longer designed to train an elite capable of guiding the
nation towards its emancipation, but to supply the system with players capable of acceptably
fulfilling their roles at the pragmatic posts required by its institutions.”   Education becomes32
dominated by the same language game as science.  The essential thing transmitted is “an
organized stock of established knowledge” necessary for the new professional class.  33
Teachers are not necessarily needed since “knowledge” can just as easily be obtained from
machines.  The important question becomes: “Where to access information?”  The only
criteria of distinction that counts is the efficient/inefficient, not true/false or just/unjust.
 Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, 46-47.30
 Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, 47-48.31
 Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, 48.32
 Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, 50.33
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Practical Implications
Standardized testing has significant implications for freedom of thought when
examined critically through Lyotard’s notion of performativity.   The established body of
knowledge, or “Truth,” is diffused through education through the medium of the
standardized test which is dominated by the scientific denotative language game.  If the
denotative scientific language game has been coopted by the technical language game, then
the correct answer on the standardized test might be determined solely based on whatever
individual or group had acquired the requisite money and technology to “verify” that
particular aspect of knowledge.  Freedom of thought requires students to consider a variety
of opinions and viewpoints, not the perspective of a privileged individual or group chosen
by the government.  As a result, performativity dominates public education through
standardized testing, not the critical education question: “What counts as knowledge?”
Lyotard’s notion of performativity controls education and teaching, as a result, is no longer
necessary.
Legitimation by Paralogy
While research and education are currently dominated by the performative language
game, Lyotard does not believe that legitimation needs to be based on the efficient/inefficient
criteria of distinction.  Lyotard advocates for a system of legitimation based on “paralogy,”
as opposed to legitimation based on a grand narrative or based on the current paradigm in
science, the stable system.
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Philosophical Foundations
Lyotard notes that postmodern science, as opposed to science based on the stable
system, is concerned with:
undecidables, the limits of precise control, conflicts characterized by
incomplete information, ‘fracta’ [emphasis in the original] catastrophes, and
pragmatic paradoxes.  It is changing the meaning of the word knowledge
[emphasis in the original], while expressing how such a change can take
place.  It is producing not the known, but the unknown.34
Systems thinking, currently the paradigm of science, leads to stability which is inconsistent
with this new research in the field of science.  The problem is that, “The stronger the ‘move,’
the more likely it is to be denied the minimum consensus, precisely because it changes the
rules of the game upon which consensus had been based.”   Lyotard refers to this type of35
behavior as “terrorist.”  He describes terror as, “the efficiency gained by eliminating, or
threatening to eliminate, a player from the language game one shares with him.  He is
silenced or consents, not because he has been refuted, but because his ability to participate
has been threatened.”   For Lyotard, it is not about achieving consensus, achieving36
dissension is what counts for a legitimation based on paralogy.  Lyotard argues that to begin
to do this one must recognize that language games are heterogeneous in order to renounce
terror and that any consensus must be local.37
 Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, 60.34
 Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, 63.35
 Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, 63-64.36
 Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, 61, 66.37
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Practical Implications
In effect, standardized testing utilizes terror.  Lyotard describes the process in the
following way:
What is a crime is to impose that silence on another, who is then excluded
from the interlocutory community.  Moreover, an even greater wrong is added
to this injustice, since the one who is banished, being prohibited from
speaking, has no means to appeal his/her banishment.  Whether political,
social, or cultural, the exercise of terror is as follows: to deprive the other of
the ability to respond to that deprivation.38
Standardized testing operates through terror by preventing the most important stakeholders
with respect to public education, students and teachers, from having a voice in determining
what counts as knowledge or how to transmit and assess that knowledge.
Lyotard believes that any language game that involves terror is unjust.  He explains,
“Majority does not mean large number, it means great fear.”    Justice, according to Lyotard,39
occurs when no minority triumphs.  He explains, “Basically, minorities are not social
ensembles; they are territories of language.  Every one of us belongs to several minorities,
and what is very important, none of them prevails.  It is only then that we can say that society
is just.”   The practice of standardized testing allows the denotative language game to40
prevail above all other language games.  There is much to fear as a result of standardized
testing being used in public education, especially with respect to citizens’ right to freedom
of thought.
 Jean-François Lyotard, Postmodern Fables, trans. Georges Van Den Abbeele (Minneapolis, MN:38
University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 209-210.
 Lyotard and Thébaud, Just Gaming, 99.39
 Lyotard and Thébaud, Just Gaming, 95.40
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The Phrase
Through his seminal work, The Differend, Lyotard develops a much more complex
notion of his concept of language games from The Postmodern Condition.  In effect, Lyotard
abandons his notion of language games in favor of the phrase as the basic unit of analysis. 
Philosophical Foundations
Lyotard has a broad conception of what constitutes a phrase and gives numerous
examples.  Phrases include, “It’s daybreak; Give me the lighter? Was she there; . . . Here are
some phrases.”   For Lyotard, a phrase can even be thought of as an event.  Examples of41
phrase events Lyotard provides are, “a shrugging of the shoulder, . . . the wagging of a dog’s
tail, . . . silence.”   There is always a phrase and it presents at least one universe (possibly42
many) which is composed of four parts, or “instances.”  These include the addressor, the
addressee, the referent, and the sense.  The addressor is the sender of the phrase, the
addressee is the receiver of the phrase, the referent is what the phrase is about, and the sense
is what is signified about the phrase.  Each of these instances can be equivocal, thus a phrase
could present multiple universes.  Every phrase belongs to a “phrase regimen.”  The phrase
regimen is the set of rules that make up the phrase.  Examples of phrase regimens include the
descriptive, prescriptive, and performative.43
Phrases from different phrase regimens cannot be translated into other phrase
regimens nor can the rules of one phrase regimen be applied to another.  Lyotard notes:
 Lyotard, The Differend, 69.41
 Lyotard, The Differend, 70.42
 Lyotard, The Differend, xii, 13-14, 70, 80. 43
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Incommensurability, in the sense of the heterogeneity of phrase regimens and
of the impossibility of subjecting them to a single law (except by neutralizing
them), also marks the relation between either cognitives or prescriptives and
interrogatives, performatives, exclamatives . . . For each of these regimens,
there corresponds a mode of presenting a universe, and one mode is not
translatable into another.44
Instead, phrases must be linked onto other phrases.
Linking can be done in a variety of ways, but linking itself is a necessity.  This
linking is done based on a “genre of discourse” that establishes the rules for linking
depending on a particular goal.  Examples of  genres of discourse include dialogue, historical
inquiry, logic, and science.  Examples of goals include to know, to be just, and to evaluate. 
Linking not only establishes the relations between the phrase instances, but also limits the
possible relations between phrases that might have occurred since one genre of discourse
“wins” as opposed to the others that “lose.”  This conflict between genres of discourse
creates what Lyotard calls a “differend”  since multiple phrases from different phrase45
regimens can be linked onto the previous phrase based on multiple genres of discourse.  46
Practical Implications
The implied goal of standardized testing is to assess student knowledge.  Each
question and each answer choice on the standardized test can be considered a phrase.  The
genre of discourse of standardized testing limits the possible phrases acceptable on the test
by controlling the linkages.  Only descriptive, or cognitive, phrases that fit the true/false
criteria of distinction are considered acceptable links in the standardized testing genre of
 Lyotard, The Differend, 128.44
 Lyotard’s notion of the differend is defined in the next section.45
 Lyotard, The Differend, xii, 29, 66, 70-71, 80, 89.46
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discourse.  Although the phrase that represents the question can be equivocal, the phrases
representing the answers do not allow for questions presenting multiple universes.  The
“correct” answer has already been determined by the addressor, the government, without any
input from the addressee, the student.  Assessing student knowledge need not be limited to
the genre of discourse of standardized testing.  As a result, the privileging of the genre of
discourse of standardized testing by the government not only limits freedom of thought, but
also constitutes a differend.
The Differend
Lyotard defines a differend as, “a case of conflict, between (at least) two parties, that
cannot be equitably resolved for lack of a rule of judgment applicable to both arguments.”47
A differend is distinguished from litigation because in litigation, both parties agree to the rule
of judgement.  In a differend, there is a victim, not a plaintiff.  A plaintiff is able to prove that
the damages occurred, while a victim does not have the ability to prove the damages.
Philosophical Foundations
Lyotard further explains his concept of a differend saying it is:
the case where the plaintiff is divested of the means to argue and becomes for
that reason a victim.  If the addressor, the addressee, and the sense of the
testimony are neutralized, everything takes place as if there were no damages
. . . A case of differend between two parties takes place when the ‘regulation’
of the conflict that opposes them is done in the idiom of one of the parties
while the wrong suffered by the other is not signified in that idiom.48
 Lyotard, The Differend, xi.47
 Lyotard, The Differend, 8-10.48
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Lyotard provides an extensive description of how the differend can be indicated.  Lyotard
explains:
The differend is signaled by the inability to prove.  The one who lodges the
complaint is heard, but the one who is a victim, and who is perhaps the same
one, is reduced to silence.  . . . The differend is the unstable state and instant
of language wherein something which must be able to be put into phrases
cannot yet be.  This state includes silence, which is a negative phrase, but it
also calls upon phrases which are in principle possible.  This state is signaled
by what one ordinarily calls a feeling: “One cannot find the words,” etc. . . .
In the differend, something “asks” to be put into phrases, and suffers from the
wrong of not being able to be put into phrases right away.  49
Lyotard explains how the differend can be redressed.  He notes:
To give the differend its due is to institute new addressees, new addressors,
new significations, and new referents in order for the wrong to find an
expression and for the plaintiff to cease being a victim.  This requires new
rules for the formation and linking of phrases.  No one doubts that language
is capable of admitting these new phrase families or new genres of discourse. 
Every wrong ought to be able to be put into phrases.  A new competence (or
‘prudence’) must be found.50
Lyotard provides an example of the differend based on Robert Faurisson, a Holocaust denier. 
Faurisson denies that gas chambers existed.  As proof for the existence of gas chambers,
Faurisson requires an eyewitness that was a victim of the gas chamber.  Since there is not a
victim that is alive and because the survivors are silent, Faurisson concludes that gas
chambers do not exist.  Lyotard believes that silence is a phrase and silence indicates that at
least one of the parts of the phrase universe is denied.  The silence might indicate that the
addressor does not believe the addressee has the competence or is worthy to speak to about
it (the addressee),  that the referent never took place (the referent), that it cannot be expressed
 Lyotard, The Differend, 10, 13.49
 Lyotard, The Differend, 13.50
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(the sense), and/or the addressor does not believe they have the competence to present it
(addressor).   Silence does not always indicate, as Faurisson believes, that the referent never
took place.  Faurisson is operating in a different genre of discourse.  Anyone attempting to
prove the existence of gas chambers to Faurisson is not going to be successful since both
parties do not accept the same rule of judgement.  This is an example of a differend.51
Practical Implications
Standardized testing is consistent with Lyotard’s notion of a differend.  Both teachers
and students become victims as a result of the silence imposed by the government.  Teachers
are left out of the procedures to determine what counts as knowledge.  In addition, a student
might be able to prove competence through the use of a different phrase regimen, but
responses in the standardized testing genre of discourse are limited to the cognitive phrases
that have already been established by the government.  From a Lyotardian perspective, this
is troublesome since there is no objective reality.
Reality
Lyotard defines reality as, “a state of the referent (that about which one speaks) which
results from the effectuation of establishment procedures defined by a unanimously agreed-
upon protocol, and from the possibility offered to anyone to recommence this effectuation
as often as he or she wants.”   Essentially, Lyotard argues that reality is a social construction52
that can be amended at any time.  As a result, there is no such thing as an objective reality. 
 Lyotard, The Differend, 3-4, 14, 19.51
 Lyotard, The Differend, 4-5.52
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Philosophical Foundations
One such protocol is historical inquiry.  In historical inquiry, it is necessary to
validate cognitive phrases.  Validation is a genre of discourse since it is impossible to
validate a particular phrase within its own phrase regimen.  Lyotard spends considerable time
discussing the validation of cognitive phrases, which means establishing the reality of the
referent.   53
The “name” is important in establishing the reality of the referent.  Lyotard notes that
it is the name that holds the descriptive phrase and the ostensive phrase together.  For
Lyotard, a name holds no meaning.  Multiple descriptions can be attached to the same name. 
The reality of the referent can be determined if the referent is the same in three phrases. 
These phrases must include a descriptive phrase, a nominative phrase, and a ostensive
phrase.  Lyotard provides an example.  The descriptive phrase is, “The Empire has a capital
for its political center.”  The nominative phrase is, “This capital is called Rome.”  The
ostensive phrase is, “Here is Rome.”  A fourth phrase is also needed in order to  acknowledge
that the referent is the same in all three phrases.   Reality then, for Lyotard, is not objective54
and can never be certain, it can always be questioned.  Lyotard further describes his view of
reality, “Reality: a swarm of senses lights upon a field pinpointed by a world.  It is able to
be signified [descriptive phrase], to be shown [ostensive phrase], and to be named
 Lyotard, The Differend, 29, 48.53
 Lyotard, The Differend, 39, 42-44, 47.54
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[nominative phrase], all three.”   Reality, as a consequence, causes a differend.  Lyotard55
explains:
Reality entails the differend.  That’s Stalin, here he is [emphasis in original]. 
We acknowledge it.  But as for what Stalin [emphasis in original] means? 
Phrases come to be attached to this name, which not only describe different
senses for it (this can still be debated in dialogue), and not only place the
name on different instances, but which also obey heterogeneous regimens
and/or genres.  This heterogeneity, for lack of a common idiom, makes
consensus impossible.  The assignment of a definition to Stalin necessarily
does wrong to the nondefinitional phrases relating to Stalin, which this
definition, for a while at least, disregards or betrays.56
In sum, according to Lyotard, reality is made up and determined by phrases.  Since phrases
are from a variety of incommensurable phrase regimens and genres of discourse, it is
impossible for any objective depiction of reality to emerge.  Consensus is not possible, only
the differend.57
A differend also occurs when the cognitive rules for establishing the reality of the
referent are applied to other phrases.  Not all referents are subject to cognition.  Lyotard
distinguishes between “objects of cognition” and “object[s] of an idea.”  Objects of
cognition, such as a cell, can be observed.  Objects of an idea, such as freedom, cannot be
observed.  Freedom, or any object of an idea, according to Lyotard, are not referents for
phrase regimens based on knowledge, nor can their reality be established.  Lyotard describes
the attempt to establish the reality of an object of an idea as “totalitarianism.”  He explains:
If the requirement of establishing the reality of a phrase’s referent according
to the protocol of cognition is extended to any given phrase, especially to
 Lyotard, The Differend, 50.55
 Lyotard, The Differend, 55-56.56
 Lyotard, The Differend, 84.57
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those phrases that refer to a whole, then this requirement is totalitarian in
principle.  That’s why it is important to distinguish between phrase regimens,
and this comes down to limiting the competence of a given tribunal to a given
kind of phrase.58
If there is no such thing as an objective reality, then there are fundamental implications with
respect to the practice of standardized testing.
Practical Implications
The protocol for establishing reality through standardized testing resides with the
government.  The standardized tests are used to determine if schools are teaching the
particular “Truth” established by the government.  Students and teachers are both left out of
deciding how students should be assessed and establishing the procedures for deciding the
reality of the referent.  Instead, teachers are subjected to teaching the particular “Truth”
advocated by the government on the standardized test.  Teachers are silenced.
Many aspects of knowledge that students need to be exposed to in order to become
effective citizens are not objects of cognition, rather they are objects of an idea.  For
example, knowledge in the realm of efficiency, justice, and beauty are objects of an idea and
are unable to be adequately translated into the cognitive arena.  In addition, many aspects of
citizenship require decisions and evaluations to be made regarding objects of an idea that are
outside the cognitive phrase regimen.  As such, the rules of the cognitive phrase regimen
cannot be applied without constituting a differend.  Standardized testing is totalitarian in
nature since it requires that all knowledge be translated into cognitive statements.  In
addition, standardized testing represents a politics of the intellectual since the cognitive genre
 Lyotard, The Differend, 4-5, 27.58
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is advocated above all other genres.  Instead of being prepared to become citizens, students
are being taught a particular “Truth” sanctioned by the government.
Politics
Like cognitive phrases, prescriptive phrases which deal with politics require
validation as well.  This validation must take place outside of the prescriptive phrase
regimen.
Philosophical Foundations
A prescriptive phrase requires a normative phrase to validate it.   Lyotard quotes an59
example from the work of Kalinowski.  The prescriptive phrase is, “It is an obligation for x
to carry out act á.”  The normative phrase is, “It is a norm for y that ‘it is obligatory for x to
carry out act á.”   Republics are legitimated on the notion that the addressor of the normative60
phrase (y) and the addressee of the prescriptive phrase (x) are the same.  The maker of the
law is subject to the law and the person subject to the law can make the law.  The phrases
become, “We decree as a norm that it is an obligation for us to carry out act á.”   Lyotard61
argues that the homogenous “we” is really heterogenous.
 As noted above, the “we” occupies two different positions, addressor of the
normative phrase and addressee of the prescriptive phrase.  The use of “we” masks this
difference between incommensurable phrase regimens.  Lyotard explains, “With the
normative, whatever its supposed legitimation and whatever the form of this legitimation
 Lyotard, The Differend, 98.59
 G. Kalinowski, La Logique Des Normes (Paris, France: 1972), Nos. 203-209, quoted in Lyotard,60
The Differend, 98. 
 Lytoard, The Differend, 98.61
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(myth, revelation, deliberation), one genre seizes upon heterogeneous phrases and
subordinates them to the same set of stakes.”   This is another example of the differend. 62
Lyotard explains, “In the deliberative politics of modern democracies, the differend is
exposed, even though the transcendental appearance of a single finality that would bring it
to a resolution persists in helping forget the differend, in making it bearable.”   Lyotard63
continues:
The deliberative is more ‘fragile’ than the narrative (. . .), it lets the abysses
be perceived that separate genres of discourse from each other and even
phrase regimens from each other, the abysses that threaten ‘the social bond.’
. . . In a word: narrative is a genre; deliberation is a concatenation of genres,
and that suffices to let the occurrence and differends sprout up within it.64
The above account of the differend in deliberative politics of modern democracies leads to
Lyotard’s notion of politics.
Politics, for Lyotard, is not a genre of discourse.  Lyotard describes politics as, “the
threat of the differend.  . . . Everything is political if politics is the possibility of the differend
on the occasion of the slightest linkage.  Politics is not everything, though, if by that one
believes it to be the genre that contains all the genres.  It is not a genre.”   Since it is65
impossible to avoid the differend, Lyotard proposes that the importance of politics is to try
and expose the differend.  He explains, “What is at stake in a literature, in a philosophy, in
 Lyotard, The Differend, 98, 144.62
 Lyotard, The Differend, 147.63
 Lyotard, The Differend, 150.64
 Lyotard, The Differend, 138-139.65
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a politics perhaps, is to bear witness to differends by finding idioms for them.”   These new66
idioms, no doubt, will lead to other differends, which in turn must be exposed as well.
Practical Implications
Standardized testing, when analyzed through Lyotard’s notion of politics, does not
prepare students to expose the differend.  The standardized test attempts to mask the
difference between phrase regimens by subjecting all phrases to the true/false criteria of
distinction of the cognitive phrase regimen.  Freedom of thought, like politics, necessitates
multiple phrase regimens.  Because the United States Supreme Court is the final arbitrator
regarding constitutionality, it is important to consider standardized testing in light of the
Brandenburg decision.
Brandenburg Test
As discussed previously, the Brandenburg test is used to determine the
constitutionality of speech/thought.  Suppression of speech/thought by the government, under
Brandenburg (1969), requires that the speech/thought not only incite criminal activity, but
also be likely to produce the said action.  Standardized testing suppresses speech/thought by
reducing all knowledge to cognitive phrases and silencing students and teachers.  It is hard
to imagine that all knowledge outside of the cognitive phrase regimen would incite criminal
activity, let alone be likely to produce it.  As a result, the suppression of speech/thought
meets neither prong of the Brandenburg test.  Subsequently, standardized testing is not
consistent with the type of education necessary to prepare students to exercise their right to
freedom of thought.
 Lyotard, The Differend, 13.66
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Summary
The purpose of this chapter was to examine the implications of standardized testing
on freedom of thought through a Lyotardian lens.  The Lyotardian examination revealed that
standardized testing is conducted exclusively through cognitive statements and entirely in
the denotative language game when freedom of thought requires other language games.  The
examination also showed that standardized testing privileges the viewpoint of certain
individuals and groups who hold power instead of the multiple viewpoints necessary to
sustain freedom of thought.  In addition, standardized testing operates through terror and is
unjust.  The practice constitutes a differend since the genre of discourse limits phrases to the
cognitive phrase regimen.  As a result, teachers and students become victims.  Finally, the
Lyotardian examination reveals the totalitarian nature of standardized testing which does not
allow for multiple phrase regimens and does not prepare students for citizenship.
Considering the United States Supreme Court’s Brandenburg decision, it was concluded that
standardized testing is not consistent with the type of education necessary to prepare students
to exercise their right to freedom of thought. 
Chapter 6
Standardized Testing and Political Judgement:
A Lyotardian Examination
There is no genre whose hegemony over the others would be just.1
-Jean-François Lyotard
Introduction
The purpose of this Critical Enquiry is to examine whether the practice of
government mandated standardized achievement tests of knowledge in American public
schools is consistent with the type of education necessary for citizens to exercise their right
to freedom of thought in order to make informed political judgements.  Beginning with a
review of the notion of political judgement, this chapter is an examination of the implications
of standardized testing on political judgement through a Lyotardian lens.  Since the analysis
depends on an adequate understanding of Lyotard, Lyotard’s philosophy is integrated
throughout the analysis.




As discussed in Chapter 1, successful governance in a democracy requires citizens
who possess the ability and resources to make informed political judgements.  Political
judgements are made regarding the allocation of values.  The notion of political judgement,
as discussed in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, changes throughout history.  Beginning with
Protagoras, political judgement was considered to be inside the individual.  Plato, on the
other hand, situated political judgement outside the individual.  Truth is only possessed by
philosopher kings who, having escaped the metaphorical cave, are exposed to truth. 
Aristotle, taking a more practical approach, argued that through virtue, individual citizens
could make appropriate political judgements.  Cicero and Augustine, like Plato, situated
political judgement outside the individual.  Cicero looked to an eternal force only understood
by the wise man, while Augustine noted that the ultimate judgement rests with God.  Aquinas
also situated political judgement with God, but privileged the work of Aristotle instead of
Plato.  Machiavelli moves political judgement back to the realm of the individual dependent
on the situation at hand.  Science becomes dominant with respect to political judgement with
Bacon.  Hobbes, on the other hand, brings political judgement solely in control of the
absolute monarch.  Descartes believed that “correct” reason will lead to correct judgement. 
Milton supported a free commonwealth and a political judgement that rests with individuals. 
Spinoza’s notion of political judgement is consistent with Milton, as is Locke.
Montesquieu was primarily concerned with preventing abuse of power and, as a
result, situated political judgement with elected representatives.  Hume believed that only the
upper class should possess political judgement.  Political judgement, for Rousseau is based
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on his notion of the general will.  Kant believed that individuals ought to possess political
judgement using regulative judgement based on his idea of freedom.  Hegel, who argued that
the population is too large in modern society, did not support individual citizens possessing
political judgement.  Mill, a utilitarian, supported citizens utilizing the Utility principle to
determine political judgements.  Marx urged for the abolition of private property and
supported a communist society.  Nietzsche was critical of any notion of political judgement
and Heidegger challenged the prevailing notion of truth.  Finally, Rawls position on political
judgement is consistent with modern democracies in that it resides with the individual in the
voting booth.  The remainder of this chapter examines the implications of standardized
testing on political judgement.
Lyotardian Examination
This section is a deconstruction of the practice of standardized achievement testing
through the work of Lyotard.  Each section begins with the philosophical foundations
followed by the practical implications.   Of particular importance for this deconstruction is2
Lyotard’s Just Gaming.  Presented as a conversation between Lyotard and Jean-Loup
Thébaud,   Just Gaming entails much of Lyotard’s work on political judgement.  Specifically,3
this text concerns the notion of a criteria for judgement.  The discussion begins with Lyotard
and Thébaud highlighting the unusual nature of how the controversial book Libidinal
Economy was written.  Lyotard associates himself with the Sophists when explaining that he
did not intend Libidinal Economy to be dialectical, where readers can ask the author
 See footnote 8in Chapter 5.2
 Jean-Loup Thébaud was editor of L’esprit.3
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questions to determine the truth, but to be instead, persuasive.  Just Gaming, in addition, is
not intended to discover the truth in Libidinal Economy, but rather to be an entirely new book
based on a conversation.  Lyotard notes the difference between this book, a conversation, and
previous books in that the goal is not necessarily to be consistent with previous work.  He
explains that a conversation is an entirely different language game than a book.  For Lyotard,
Libidinal Economy, was about “cast[ing] bottles to the waves, you don’t know to whom they
are going, and that is all to the good.”   Lyotard describes this type of writing as postmodern.4 5
Lyotard distinguishes between modern and postmodern.  Postmodern means that
there is no subject of history.  Lyotard explains, “what we call modernity [postmodernity],
he no longer knows for whom he writes, since there no longer is any taste; there no longer
is any internalized system of rules that would permit a sorting out, the dropping of some
things and the introduction of some others, all of this before the fact, in the act of writing.”  6
For Lyotard, the postmodern is about trying out new things and that there are no solid criteria
to judge things, as opposed to the modern.  In the modern, “stable judgments of taste . . . can
be supposed, and new works can be created with these judgments as models.”   Essentially,7
the significant difference between modern and postmodern is that no criteria for judgement
 Lyotard and Thébaud, Just Gaming, 1-9.4
 Lyotard does not use the term postmodern in Just Gaming.  Instead, he uses the term modern. 5
Lyotard’s use of the term modern in Just Gaming is similar to his use of the term postmodern in The
Postmodern Condition.  As such, this study will use the term postmodern when summarizing aspects of
Lyotard’s writing that utilize the term modern.  Brackets will be inserted following quotations when the word
modern is used to clarify.  See the asterisk on page 16 of Just Gaming for further clarification.  
 Lyotard and Thébaud, Just Gaming, 9-10. 6
 Lyotard and Thébaud, Just Gaming, 9-11.7
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exists within the postmodern.  Lyotard uses the term “pagan”  to denote a scenario where one8
judges without criteria.  This judgement can occur in a wide variety of areas, including truth,
beauty, justice, politics, and ethics.  For Lyotard, “modernity [postmodernity] is pagan.”  9
The question of Just Gaming is, how can one determine what is just/unjust without a criteria
for judgement.
Paganism
Lyotard, in Just Gaming, refers to the process of making judgements without criteria
as paganism.  Lyotard notes that justice in the Western tradition has always involved a fixed
criteria of judgement that dominates questions of justice.  Lyotard describes this as a paradox
since it is based on the idea that the “prescriptive can be derived from the descriptive.”   A10
prescription deals with a command, while a description deals with truth.  Lyotard argues that
a statement cannot pass from one to the other.  This model of justice is incompatible with
Lyotard’s notion of paganism.  
Philosophical Foundations
Lyotard utilizes the work of Aristotle to help explain his notion of paganism.  Lyotard
notes that, based on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics:
a judge worthy of the name has no true model to guide his judgments, and
that the true nature of the judge is to pronounce judgments, and therefore
prescriptions, just so, without criteria.  This is . . . what Aristotle calls
 Lyotard does not use pagan as a derogatory term.8
 Lyotard and Thébaud, Just Gaming, 15-16.9
 Lyotard and Thébaud, Just Gaming, 19-21.10
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prudence.  It consists in dispensing justice without models.  It is not possible
to produce a learned discourse on what justice is.11
Aristotle’s judge and paganism is about judgement in the realm of opinion, not truth, and it
is a case by case judgement.  There is no metadiscourse for justice.  The other component in
Lyotard’s description of paganism is the elimination of the theory of autonomy from the
question of justice.  The theory of autonomy implies that prescriptions determined and
applied to society as a whole will be just.   Lyotard explains paganism:12
On the contrary, in paganism, there is the intuition, the idea – in the almost
Kantian sense of the term, if I may say so – that is, the idea that no maker of
statements, no utterer, is ever autonomous.  On the contrary, an utterer is
always someone who is first of all an addressee, and I would even say one
destined.  By this I mean that he is someone who, before he is the utterer of
a prescription, has been the recipient of a prescription, and that he is merely
a relay; he has also been the object of a prescription.  To determine paganism
then, one needs not only to oppose it to the theory of the model, to give this
name to the theory that one finds in Plato, but one must also oppose it to the
theory of autonomy.   13
Lyotard provides as an example, the Cashinahua Indians.  When the Cashinahua tell a story,
they are essentially relays.  The story has been told to them before and it is their obligation
to tell someone else.  The teller’s name is not important, the tradition is.  This is heteronomy,
not autonomy.  The author is anonymous.  This is the pagan game, and one of the three
pragmatic positions Lyotard describes.   14
 Lyotard and Thébaud, Just Gaming, 22, 26.11
 Lyotard and Thébaud, Just Gaming, 25, 28-31.12
 Lyotard and Thébaud, Just Gaming, 31.13
 Lyotard and Thébaud, Just Gaming, 32-36.14
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The first pragmatic position is that of autonomy.  Philosophical discourse is an
example.  In this position, the addressor is privileged and has control and authority.  The
second pragmatic position is that of obligation.  An example of this is Jewish thought.  In this
position, the addressee is privileged and has the duty to listen.  The third pragmatic position
is that of pagan.  An example would be the Cashinahua Indians described above.   Following15
the Cahinahua Indians, Lyotard summarizes the idea of pagan:
one will have to judge therefore by opinion alone, that is, without criteria. 
And here I get back to Aristotle.  We are always within opinion, and there is
no possible discourse of truth on the situation.  And there is no such discourse
because one is caught up in a story, and one cannot get out of this story to
take up a metalinguistic position from which the whole could  be dominated. 
We are always immanent to stories in the making, even when we are the ones
telling the story to the other.  . . . there is no place from which one could
photograph the whole thing.    16
   
For Lyotard, the pagan position implies that there is no such thing as a metadiscourse.  It is
important to examine the implications of standardized testing on political judgement from
a Lyotardian perspective.
Practical Implications
Standardized testing has implications for political judgement when analyzed through
Lyotard’s notion of paganism.  Standardized testing, as discussed in Chapter 5, is limited to
cognitive statements that can be declared true/false.  If there is no fixed criteria of judgement,
as Lyotard argues through his notion of paganism, and political judgements must be made
in the realm of opinion based on an Aristotelean case by case judgement, then students need
 Lyotard and Thébaud, Just Gaming, 37-38.15
 Lyotard and Thébaud, Just Gaming, 43.16
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to be exposed to much more than cognitive statements.  Political judgements are made in
numerous language games.  For example, citizens must make judgements in the realm of
truth, beauty, and ethics.  Of particular importance is the prescriptive language game in
which citizens must determine what is just/unjust.  Standardized testing, operating in the
pragmatic position of autonomy, in which the government has complete control and
authority, does not prepare students to make the political judgements necessary in Lyotard’s
postmodern society.  Lyotard continues by further explaining language games.  
Language Games
Lyotard expounds on his notion of language games in response to Thébaud’s repeated
questioning of why prescriptive statements cannot be derived from descriptive statements.
Lyotard argues that to derive a prescription from a description has been “the tradition of the
intellectual.”    17
Philosophical Foundations
Lyotard notes, in contrast, that prescriptive statements and descriptive statements are
part of different language games.  He also provides examples of other language games
including the scientific denotative language game and the artistic language game.  Lyotard 
further explains the concept of language games:
When I say: There is no common measure, it means that we know that we
know of nothing in common with these different language games.  We merely
know that there are several of them, probably not an infinite number, but we
really do not know.  In any case, the number is not countable for the time
being, or if it is, it is so provisional at best.  We also know that these are
games that we can enter into but not to play them; they are games that make
us into their players . . . these games are not at all made equal.  On the
 Lyotard and Thébaud, Just Gaming, 44-45.17
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contrary, they are in a striking disparity.  The fact that I myself speak of this
plurality does not imply that I am presenting myself as the occupant of a
unitary vantage point upon the whole set of these games . . .18
Lyotard is arguing that each game has its own rules and one game cannot be translated into
another.  He explains that this would be as absurd as trying to take the rules of chess and
translate them into the rules of checkers.  In addition, one language game is in no way
superior to another.  Language games are always played between people.  There is an
addressee, an addressor, and a referent.  Also, people play multiple language games at the
same time and jump from one game to another.     19
  Lyotard differentiates an instruction from a slogan.  Lyotard uses the word instruction
to signify what should be done in a certain situation.  Instructions, as a result, are local.  An
example would be a principal giving directions to the teachers in the school.  A slogan, on
the other hand, implies that the situation is permanent.  An example would be the Secretary
of Education giving directions to teachers in every school.  Lyotard notes:
When one speaks of instructions, one is basically implying that one does not
really know the permanent general context and that one would have to be
quite conceited to be able to do an analysis of it.  And so one works almost
‘case by case,’ move by move, and instructions are a move-by-move
process.20
Lyotard privileges instructions over slogans since they more readily respect his notion of
paganism.  No metadiscourse exists to unify the different language games.  No one game can
speak for all the others.   Instead of oppression, “to import into a language game a question
 Lyotard and Thébaud, Just Gaming, 45, 51.18
 Lyotard and Thébaud, Just Gaming, 52-54.19
 Lyotard and Thébaud, Just Gaming, 55-56.20
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that comes from another and to impose it,”   Lyotard advocates for a “multiplicity of small21
narratives.”22
Lyotard explains that in paganism, there is no master language game.  He explains,
“What is pagan is the acceptance of the fact that one can play several games, and that each
of these games is interesting in itself insofar as the interesting thing is to play moves.  And
to play moves means precisely to develop ruses, to set the imagination to work.”  23
Imagination can be used to create and/or modify moves or even language games.  The pagan
then, according to Lyotard, is able to use this imagination in a variety of language games. 
Someone who is not pagan tends to “believe in the signified of what they are saying, that they
stick to this signified, and that they think they are in the true.  This is where paganism stops
and where something like doctrine, let us say, gets back in.”24
Practical Implications
Examining the implications of the practice of standardized testing on political
judgement based on Lyotard’s notion of language games raises important issues.  The
standardized test is established based on Lyotard’s concept of a slogan since the standardized
test is given to every student.  As a result, the practice of standardized testing operates under
the assumption that all situations can be generalized and does not allow for local school
district considerations.  In addition, the cognitive language game oppresses all other language
 Lyotard and Thébaud, Just Gaming, 53.21
 Lyotard and Thébaud, Just Gaming, 58-59.22
 Lyotard and Thébaud, Just Gaming, 60-61.23
 Lyotard and Thébaud, Just Gaming, 61-62.24
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games and operates as a metadiscourse.  This fits with what Lyotard calls the tradition of the
intellectual and doctrine.  Since political judgement requires multiple language games,
schools (to be consistent with the primary purpose of preparing students for citizenship)
ought to focus more on instructions and less on slogans.
Justice
The conversation moves in the direction of the prescriptive language game at this
point, since this is the game of justice.  Lyotard notes that when the prescriptive language
game is pure, no ontological discourse dominates it.  
Philosophical Foundations
Western thought, following Plato, has generally used some ontological discourse to
determine what is just.  But, for Lyotard, as discussed above, reason cannot be used to derive
prescriptions and prescriptions can never be justified.  The prescriptive language game is not
about content, but “obligation.”  Lyotard describes injustice, that which is unjust, as the
exclusion of the pragmatics of obligation.  In short, injustice is threatening or preventing
someone from taking part in the prescriptive language game.  For Lyotard, terror is an
example of this injustice.  With terror, “it is the death of another person, a threat of death that
is used as an argument.  . . . the real aim is to force the third party [public opinion] to yield.”  25
Thébaud (Lyotard’s interlocutor) transitions this into a discussion of what justice ought to
be.
For Lyotard, justice cannot be derived, instead he believes there is a “transcendence
of justice.”  Lyotard does not use transcendence of justice to mean there is a transcendence,
 Lyotard and Thébaud, Just Gaming, 64-67.25
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but instead he means that he does not know who is the sender of a particular prescription. 
The obligation that results, according to Lyotard, is regulated by the Kantian “Idea.”  For
Lyotard, this Idea is “the preservation of the possibility of the prescriptive game.”   Lyotard26
provides a thorough description of the prescriptive language game:
When I say ‘transcendence,’ I take over a term used by Lévinas, and also by
Kant when the  latter says that which obligates is something absolutely
beyond our intelligence.  In terms of language games, it must be granted that
to understand what a prescription or obligation is, the pole of the sender must
be neutralized.  Only if it is neutralized, will one become sensitive, not to
what it says, but to the fact that it prescribes or obligates.  It may seem
paradoxical . . . But there are language games in which the important thing
is to listen, in which the rule deals with audition.  Such a game is the game
of the just.  And in this game, one speaks only inasmuch as one listens, that
is, one speaks as a listener, and not as an author.  . . . the position of sender
must remain empty.  No one may put herself or himself there, no one may be
the authority.  . . . the prescriptive utterance comes from nothing: its
pragmatic virtue of obligation results from neither its content nor its utterer.  27
The absence of any universal ontological discourse to determine justice has significant
implications with respect to standardized testing.
Practical Implications
Standardized testing has significant implications for political judgement when
examined through Lyotard’s notion of justice.  As discussed previously, standardized testing
operates through terror since it prevents students and teachers from determining the reality
of the referent.  In addition, the practice of standardized testing is unjust since students are
prevented from taking part in the prescriptive language game.  Instead, the prescriptive
language game is transformed into the descriptive language game.  Students are taught that
 Lyotard and Thébaud, Just Gaming, 69-70.26
 Lyotard and Thébaud, Just Gaming, 71-72.27
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the only criteria of distinction that counts is true/false.  It is impossible for standardized
testing to utilize the prescriptive language game since the position of the sender is occupied
by the government.  The government is not subject to neutralization.  Since it is impossible
to eliminate the authority of the government, standardized testing cannot be used to prepare
citizens to make informed political judgements.
Politics of Judgement
Lyotard continues by attempting to formulate a political judgement that can be used
in the postmodern.  Lyotard argues that due to the collapse and failure of “rational politics,”28
it is necessary to formulate a postmodern “politics of judgment.”   Lyotard wavers between29
two positions.  These positions are a pagan position and a Kantian position.  Both the pagan
position and Kantian position respect the notion that a prescriptive cannot be derived from
a descriptive.  Knowledge does not play a role in ethics, politics, or justice.  In addition, both
accept that judgement is made on a case by case basis.   Both positions are described below.30
Philosophical Foundations
The pagan position is that of the Sophists and the Aristotle of the politics and ethics. 
The pagan position is based on a philosophy of opinion or convention.  Lyotard believes that
this is problematic due to the great number of unjust acts that have occurred throughout
history as a result of various conventions.  The Holocaust is one such example.  The Kantian
 Rational politics is the Western tradition of deriving prescriptions from descriptions or the ought28
from the is.  In short, there is no knowledge in matters of ethics, politics, or justice.  Lyotard and Thébaud, Just
Gaming, 75.
 A “Politics of Judgment” is the title for the fifth day of the interview.  Lyotard and Thébaud, Just29
Gaming, 73.
 Lyotard and Thébaud, Just Gaming, 73-74.30
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position is that of both Kant’s second and third critiques which is based on the philosophy
of the Idea.  In this philosophy, the regulator is the Idea of justice (“totality of practical
reasonable beings”).   Lyotard describes this as a “reflective use of judgment, that is, a31
maximization of concepts outside of any knowledge of reality.  . . . the Idea is not an opinion. 
The Idea is an almost unlimited use of the concept: one has concepts, and then one
maximizes them.”   Lyotard believes this is problematic since the Idea is not based on32
opinion.  
Lyotard believes that in order to fully give meaning to his term pagan, the two
positions need to be brought together.  He explains, “Because then it would include justice,
and a justice that would not be merely unanimous convention, which is something that
cannot be tolerated.”   To do this, Thébaud suggests a “politics of judgment.”  This politics33
of judgement would be based on opinions, but regulated by Kant’s notion of judgement.  34
Ideas are not determining concepts, they are only used in the reflective.  As such, the
reflective use of an Idea never determines what one should do.  Instead, the Idea regulates. 
An individual must judge whether something is compatible with the Idea and this is not
based on knowledge or the descriptive at all.  While Lyotard accepts the use of the Idea as
the regulating aspect of judgement, he rejects Kant’s notion of the Idea of totality.35
 Lyotard and Thébaud, Just Gaming, 73-75.31
 Lyotard and Thébaud, Just Gaming, 75.32
 Lyotard and Thébaud, Just Gaming, 81.33
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Lyotard is concerned with using the Idea to promote “multiplicity” or “diversity.”  36
Lyotard believes that if Kant would have written a critique of political reason, Kant might
well have accepted that politics is in the realm of opinions and he would have used
Aristotle’s notion of the judge who decides on a case by case basis.  Lyotard believes that
what makes someone judge is the Idea.  This Idea, for regulating justice, has no basis in
knowledge.  As a result, the Idea cannot be used as a criteria for judgement.  If the Idea is
used as a determinant of justice, Lyotard believes terror (discussed above) would result.37
Practical Implications
Lyotard’s politics of judgement raises concerns with respect to the implications of
standardized testing on political judgement.  Standardized testing does not prepare students
to make informed political judgements for a variety of reasons.  First, since prescriptions can
not be derived from descriptions, consistent with Lyotard, standardized testing can only
operate in the cognitive language game and does not prepare students to effectively operate
in other language games such as the prescriptive language game.  Second, since knowledge
does not have a role in ethics, politics, or justice, standardized testing, by focusing solely on
cognitive knowledge at the exclusion of values, does not prepare students to make
judgements.  Third, since judgements are made on a case by case basis, according to Lyotard,
standardized testing does not allow for judgement since the government has already
determined the correct response.  Lyotard’s politics of judgement is incompatible with
 Lyotard and Thébaud, Just Gaming, 87.36
 Lyotard and Thébaud, Just Gaming, 88, 91-92.37
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standardized testing since standardized testing does not allow students to operate in the realm
of opinion nor utilize reflective Ideas in the course of making judgements.
Multiplicity of Language Games
Lyotard concludes Just Gaming by describing a framework based on a “multiplicity
of language games.”  Having multiple language games that are incomprehensible means that
there is no unity or totality, in contrast to the beliefs of Kant.  Lyotard, instead, argues to
combine a “politics of opinion” with a “politics of Ideas.”   38
Philosophical Foundations
But the Idea for Lyotard, unlike Kant, is not based on finality or convergence, but
divergence.  Justice, according to Lyotard, occurs when no minority prevails.  He explains,
“Basically, minorities are not social ensembles; they are territories of language.  Every one
of us belongs to several minorities, and what is very important, none of them prevails.  It is
only then that we can say that society is just.”   39
If language games are pure, that is they are not contaminated by the prescriptive
language game, the idea of justice is not needed.  But, if the prescriptive game enters into
another language game, then the idea of justice, based on plurality, should regulate them. 
Justice, in this sense, is about ensuring that the rules of a particular language game are
followed.  Lyotard also describes how to ensure justice, within the prescriptive language
game, once the language games have been made pure again.  The Idea of multiplicity is what
regulates justice for Lyotard.  Justice is conducted case by case and it is impossible for one
 Lyotard and Thébaud, Just Gaming, 93-95.38
 Lyotard and Thébaud, Just Gaming, 95.39
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to ever be sure that they have been just.  Lyotard notes, “any attempt to state the law, for
example, to place oneself in the position of enunciator of the universal prescription is
obviously infatuation itself and absolute injustice.”   Lyotard believes that any language40
game that involves terror is unjust.  He explains, “Majority does not mean large number, it
means great fear.”   A minority language game only becomes a majority language game41
when it dominates other language games.  
Lyotard ends Just Gaming by summarizing his two notions of justice.  First, there is
a multiplicity of justice.  Each language game has its own rules and a good move is
determined by the criteria of distinction for that particular language game.  Lyotard explains,
“Justice here does not consist merely in the observance of the rules; as in all the games, it
consists in working at the limits of what the rules permit, in order to invent new moves,
perhaps new rules and therefore new games.”   Second, there is the justice of multiplicity. 42
This is a universal prescription.  Lyotard explains:
It prescribes the observance of the singular justice of each game such as it has
just been situated: formalism of the rules and imagination in the moves.  It
authorizes the ‘violence’ that accompanies the work of imagination.  It
prohibits terror, that is, the blackmail of death toward one’s partners, the
blackmail that a prescriptive system does not fail to make use of in order to
become the majority in most of the games and over most of their pragmatic
positions.43
 Lyotard and Thébaud, Just Gaming, 96-99.40
 Lyotard and Thébaud, Just Gaming, 99.41
 Lyotard and Thébaud, Just Gaming, 100.42
 Lyotard and Thébaud, Just Gaming, 100.43
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Lyotard’s notion of a multiplicity of language games is important to consider since
standardized testing might not respect minority language games.
Practical Implications
Since the government determines what counts as knowledge on the standardized test,
standardized testing is not consistent with Lyotard’s notion of justice.  The language game
of the government is the only game that counts.  Minority language games are not respected
since the government has exclusive control and operates as the majority language game.  The
language game of standardized testing is not pure since the prescriptive language game,
amongst others, is subjected to the rules of the descriptive language game.  Standardized
testing will not be just until it respects the rules of language games.  Even if standardized
testing became just, it still would be inconsistent in preparing citizens to make informed
political judgements.  In addition, according to Lyotard, it is impossible to know if one has
been just or has made the “right” judgement.  Since the government operates as the
“enunciator of the universal prescription,” standardized testing is “obviously infatuation itself
and absolute injustice,” based on a Lytoardian perspective.  As a result, standardized testing
is not consistent with the type of education necessary to prepare students to make informed
political judgements.
Summary
The purpose of this chapter was to examine the implications of standardized testing
on political judgement through a Lyotardian lens.  The Lyotardian examination revealed that
political judgement operates in the realm of opinion which requires students to be exposed
to more than just the cognitive language game privileged on the standardized test.  It was also
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revealed that local school districts have no voice.  The standardized test is unjust and
operates through terror.  Judgement is not allowed since the government has already
determined what counts as “Truth.”  Finally, this examination revealed that standardized
testing does not respect minority language games and is not pure.  As a result, it was
concluded that standardized testing is not consistent with the type of education necessary to
prepare students to make informed political judgements.
Chapter 7
Summary, Conclusions, and Recommendations
In a world where success means gaining time, thinking has a single, but irredeemable, fault:
it is a waste of time.1
-Jean-François Lyotard
Introduction
As discussed in Chapter 1, this Critical Enquiry recognized that the purpose of
American public education is to prepare students for the fundamental political office of
citizen.  Successful governance requires citizens who have the resources and abilities to
make informed political judgements with respect to the allocation of values.  This
necessitates that citizens utilize the constitutional guaranteed right of freedom of thought. 
The specific purpose of this Critical Enquiry was to examine whether the practice of
government mandated standardized achievement tests of knowledge in American public
schools is consistent with the type of education necessary for citizens to exercise their right
to freedom of thought in order to make informed political judgements.  The general
methodology of Critical Enquiry is based on Derrida’s notion of deconstruction with the
specific framework of this enquiry based on the work of Lyotard.
 Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Explained, trans. Don Barry, Bernadette Maher, Julian1




In order to conduct this enquiry and provide context for the reader, it was necessary
for several chapters to provide the foundation.  Chapter 2 began with an analysis of the
primary purpose of American public education and the explicit connection between freedom
of thought and freedom of speech.  This was followed by four different rationales for
freedom of speech.  These included the argument from the perspective of truth, the argument
form the perspective of democracy, the argument for the good life, and the argument for
individuality.  The chapter continued by surveying the history of freedom of thought
beginning in Ancient Greece and culminating with the United States Supreme Court’s
Brandenburg decision.
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 continued to provide the foundation by surveying the history
of the notion of political judgement.  Chapter 3 was concerned with political judgement from
Protagoras to Locke.  Initially considered inside the individual with Protagoras, political
judgement moved outside the individual with Plato.  Aristotle established political
judgements with the practical sciences.  Cicero situated political judgement with the wise
man while Augustine and Aquinas situated political judgement with God.  Machiavelli
advocated a practical version of political judgement and Bacon placed it with science. 
Hobbes supported an absolute monarch to make political judgements while Descartes
believed that reason would lead to the appropriate political judgement.  Milton, Spinoza, and
Locke, all placed political judgement with the individual.
Chapter 4 was concerned with political judgement from Montesquieu to Rawls.  For
Montesquieu, political judgement was within the hands of elected representatives.  Hume
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situated political judgement with the elite while Rousseau introduced the concept of general
will.  Kant stressed the use of regulative judgement based on his notion of freedom.  Hegel
thought individual citizens should not possess political judgement while Mill believed
individual citizens could determine political judgement based on the Utility principle.  Marx
advocated communism and Nietzsche criticized all notions of political judgement. 
Heidegger challenged the prevailing notion of truth.  Rawls believed that political judgement
ought to rest with voters in the voting booth.
The Lyotardian examination was conducted in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6.  Chapter 5
focused on the implications of the practice of standardized testing on freedom of thought,
while Chapter 6 focused on the implications of standardized testing on political judgement. 
The Lyotardian examination revealed that standardized testing is not consistent with the type
of education necessary to prepare students to exercise their right to freedom of thought nor
is the practice consistent with the type of education necessary to prepare students to make
informed political judgements. 
Conclusions
This enquiry revealed that the practice of using government mandated standardized
achievement tests of knowledge in American public schools is antithetical to the type of
education necessary to prepare students to exercise their right to freedom of thought in order
to make informed political judgements.  The Lyotardian examination revealed that freedom
of thought and political judgement require a wide variety of language games while the
practice of standardized testing is limited to the denotative cognitive language game. 
Freedom of thought and political judgement also require access to multiple viewpoints while
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standardized testing privileges the views of certain individuals and groups.  Standardized
testing marks a differend, is totalitarian in nature, and represents a politics of the intellectual. 
The practice advocates a particular “Truth” sanctioned by the government and silences
teachers, students, and local school districts through terror.  The government, through
standardized testing, operates as the majority language game and is not pure.
Recommendations
It is instructive to consider the significant difference between government education
and public education.  The practice of standardized testing is not uniform with the notion of
public, rather it is much more similar to the connotation behind the term government.  Senses
of government include, “continuous exercise of authority over the action of subjects or
inferiors,” “authoritative direction or regulation,” and “control.”   Public, on the other hand,2
is signified as an antonym of private in relation to the people in a particular area or country. 
Senses of public include, “pertaining to the people as a whole,”  “Done or made by or on
behalf of the community as a whole,” “authorized by, acting for, or representing, the
community,” “all members of the community,” and “not restricted to the private use of any
person or persons.”3
Public education, consistent with the definition of public, ought to be open to all
members of the community and represent a variety of opinions.  Public education ought not
to be restrictive privileging a particular individual or group of individuals and ought not to
be limited to standardized testing.  Future enquiry ought to consider policy and practice that
 Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed., s.v. “Government.”2
 Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed., s.v. “Public.”3
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would enable American public education to be consistent with the American democratic
ideals in order to redress the differend.  Policymakers ought to eliminate the practice of
standardized achievement tests in American public schools in order to adhere to a notion of
public education instead of government education.
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